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The question whether constitutional human rights
merely define and delimit the relationship between
citizen and state or whether such rights also apply
to relations between citizens is fundamental to any
constitutional democracy. The author examines the
scope of the application of constitutional human
rights to private law with a view to resolving the
issue for the Israeli context. He sets out and
analysesfour modelsfor defining the appropriate
scope of the application of constitutional human
rights and roots these models in the jurisprudence
of various countries. The author goes on to make
a case for the model in which constitutional hu-
man rights apply, albeit indirectly, to relations
between private citizens. Such an approach, he
argues, is the one most consistent with the guiding
impulses that drive human rights: respect for
equality, dignity and individual autonomy. In
addition, the author argues, the tools forfacilitat-
ing his model of choice already exist in private
law, in the form of concepts like "good faith,"
"public policy" and "unconscionability. "
La question visant 6 diterminer si les droits de la
personne garantis par la Constitution definissent
et rigissent seulement les rapports entre le citoyen
et l'Etat ou s'ils s'appliquent aussi aux relations
entre citoyens est essentielle t toute dimocratie
constitutionnelle. L'auteur examine le champ
d'application de ces droits constitutionnels au
droit privd en vue de risoudre la question dans le
contexte isradlien. Il propose et analyse quatre
modles visant b dtablir la portde de ces droits en
se rdfdrant 6 lajurisprudence de diffdrents pays.
L 'auteur revendique ensuite le module oi les droits
en question s'appliquent, mais indirectement, aux
relations entre simples citoyens. II soutient que
cette approche est la plus conforme aux principes
qui motivent les droits de la personne : le respect
de l'dgalitd, de la dignitd et de l'autonomie
individuelle. L'auteur ajoute que les instruments
visant Lifaciliter l'adoption de ce modle existent
dd ji) en droit privd, dans les notions de .bonne
foin, d'uordre public* et de aconduite oppressive*.
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I. PRIVATE LAW AND PUBLIC LAW
A. THE ESSENCE OF THE DISTINCTION
Western legal culture is based on the distinction between public law and
private law.1 Public law determines the allocation of power among government
authorities, and the relations between the government and private parties.
Conflicts within the realm of public law are routinely decided in the High Court
of Justice. Conflicts within the realm of private law are decided in civil courts.
This distinction between public and private law and courts has never been
pointed or sharp. Through the legislature, the government enacts laws which
regulate private relationships, and through the executive it acts in the area of
private law and makes contracts with private individuals and bodies. Conflicts
between private parties and the government cross over the line between public
and private law. Government bodies also have made "political agreements"
amongst themselves.2 Private bodies have filled public roles, and have been
For this distinction, see B. Akzin, "On Public Law" Statements of The Israel National
Academy for Sciences 72 (Volume C, 5730). See also J. Beatson, "'Public' and
'Private' in Administrative Law" (1987) 103 Law Q. Rev. 34.
2 See H.C. 1601/90 Shalit v. Peres, P.D. 44 (3) 353; H.C. 1635/90 Gergovsky v. Prime
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characterized as "quasi-public" bodies3 or as "hybrid creatures".4 Bodies have
been recognized as "dual-nature" bodies, to which "both the principles of private
law and the norms of public law" are applicable".' The obligations of trustwor-
thiness,6 fairness,7 and reasonableness' - applicable to the government in its
relations with private parties in the spheres of public law - have infiltrated
private law, initially in private law relationships between the government and
private parties,9 and subsequently in private law relationships between private
parties.'" The "good faith" principle functioned as an instrument of influence
from public law to private law, 1 and from private law to public law. 2
Fundamental concepts of public law, applicable between the government and
private parties - such as the principles of natural justice 3 and the prohibition
on conflict of interests 4 - have penetrated into relationships between private
3 Like the Jewish burial societies which operate in Israel: see Civ. App. 280/71 Gidon
v. Burial Society GHS"E, P.D. 27 (1) 10, 18, in which Judge Etzioni titles the burial
society a "quasi-public body".
4 Like the Electric Company, which has been titled a "hybrid creature": see H.C. 731/86
Micro Dafv. Electric Company, P.D. 41 (2) 449 at 461.
Civ. App. 294/91Hevra Kadisha v. Kastenbaum, P.D. 46 (2) 464.
6 See H.C. 262/62, Peretz v. Kfar Shmaryahu, P.D. 16 2101; H.C. 142/70 Shapira v.
Central Committee of the Jerusalem Bar Association, P.D. 25 (1) 325.
7 See H.C. 685/78 Umdi Machmood v. Minister of Education and Culture, P.D. 33 (1)
767.
8 See H.C. 389/80 Golden Pages Inc. v. Broadcasting Authority, P.D. 35 (1) 421.
' Such as in negotiations towards making a contract between a government body and a
private party: see H.C. 292/61 Rechovot Packing House Inc. v. Government of Israel,
P.D. 16 20 (tender); H.C. 840/79 Contractors and Builders Center of Israel v.
Government of Israel, P.D. 34 (3) 729 (negotiations without tender).
10 See Civ. App. 207/79 Raviv v. Beit Yules, P.D. 37 (1) 533; Fur. Hrg. 22/82 Beit Yules
v. Raviv, P.D. 44 (1) 441.
Ibid
12 See H.C. 376/81 Logsi v. Minister of Transportation, P.D. 36 (2) 449.
13 See H.C. 3/58 Berman v. Minister of Interior, P.D. 12 1493.
14 H.C. 174/54 Simel v. Licensed Authorityfor Emergency Land Requisition (Regulation)
Law, P.D. 9 459; H.C. 531/79 Likud Party v. Petah Tikvah City Council, P.D. 34 (2)
566.
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parties. The borderline between the jurisdiction of the Hight Court of Justice and
that of the civil court is blurred, 5 and the "twilight" zone is broad. 6
B. COMMON LAW HUMAN RIGHTS
1. Human Rights Originating in the Common Law
Fundamental human rights also are classified according to the distinction
between public and private law. Public law includes among its obligations
common law human rights which were developed by the High Court of Justice
and are directed towards the government. These are the "fundamental rights
'which are not inscribed in a book,' but rather arise directly from our State's
nature as a freedom-loving democracy. In its decisions, this Court has looked to
these fundamental rights as a guiding light for interpreting law and reviewing the
acts of the State's administrative bodies."' 7 Recognized within the framework
are, inter alia, the basic right to human dignity, freedom of occupation, freedom
of expression, and freedom of movement. Alongside this development in public
law, the civil courts have recognized human rights in private law. These rights
are aimed at other private parties, and they include, inter alia, freedom of
contract, 18 the right to one's good name, 9 freedom of movement and personal
liberty.20
2. Common Law Rights Have Also Been Applied in Private Law
Common law human rights have been applied both to the government and
to private parties. The High Court of Justice recognized their applicability
15 See H.C. 991/91 Pasternak Inc. v. Minister of Construction and Housing, P.D. 45 (5)
50.
16 See Civ. App. 256/70 Friedman v. City of Haifa, P.D. 24 (2) 577; Civ. App. 463/85
Ravivo v. Bentuv, P.D. 39 (4) 494, 497; see also 1. Zamir, Adjudication in
Administrative Cases (Jerusalem: The Hebrew University, 1987); and 1. Zamir, "Public
Tenders in Civil Courts" (1992) Mishpat Umimshal A 197.
17 H.C. 243/62, Upaney Hosrata Bisrael B.M. v. Geri, P.D. 16, 2407 at 2415 (Justice
Landau).
18 See Civ. App. 207/79, supra, note 10.
19 See Civ. App. 214/89 Avneri, et al. v. Shapira, et al. , P.D. 43 (3) 840.




HeinOnline  -- 3 Rev. Const. Stud. 222 1996
against the government, and the civil court recognized their applicability against
other private parties. Take, for example, the right to property: it has been held
that, "the property right is among the basic rights of the person in Israel."', It is
directed towards the government, which is not entitled to infringe it without
legislative authorization.22 But the property right is not directed solely against
the government, but towards "the entire world." Private parties are also not
allowed to infringe it. It is protected, inter alia, by property and tort law.
Even though the basic human rights apply both to relationships between
private parties and the government and to relationships between private parties,
a distinction between the public and private side of human rights has not been
felt to be particularly important. The reason for this is tied, first and foremost,
to the manner of development of traditional human rights; both those rights
aimed at the government and those aimed at private parties developed in a
similar manner. Their evolution begins as interpretation of legislation. Thus, for
example, freedom of procession23 was recognized as a human right in public law
in the course of interpreting the Police Ordinance, and the right to one's good
name24 was recognized as a human right in private law in the course of
interpreting the Defamation Law. Indeed, administrative and private law created
our constitutional law. The common interpretative technique for recognizing
human rights created unity of human rights, which precluded the need for
standing upon the difference between human rights in public law and human
rights in private law. Second, the "regular" legislature was entitled to mould
basic human rights at will. Even though human rights were "basic," they did not
have constitutional super-legislative status. Regular legislation could change
them, so long as it was expressed in an explicit, clear and unambiguous
fashion. 5
21 See H.C. 377/79 Peyeetzer v. Ramat Gan Local Planning and Building Committee,
P.D. 35 (3) 645, 656 (Justice Barak).
22 See H.C. 249/64 Baruch v. Director of Tax and Excise, P.D. 19 (1) 486, 489.
23 See H.C. 153/83 Levy v. Southern District Police Commander, P.D. 38 (2F) 393.
24 See Crim. App. 677/83 Burochov v. Yafet, P.D. 39 (3) 205.
25 See H.C. 337/81,Mitrani v. Sar Hatahbura, P.D. 37 (3) 337.
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3. Human Rights in Private Law
Against the background of this normative reality, the following question
arises: whether legislative human rights, set forth in the basic laws regarding
human rights, are directed towards the government only, or are they directed
both towards the government and towards other private parties? Do the
constitutional human rights set forth in the basic laws apply in private law? Is it
possible to speak about "the privatization of human rights?"26 This question is
of central importance. It arises in most legal systems and while at times it is
given an explicit answer in legislation, most constitutional texts are ambiguous,
and the determination is judicial.27
II. MODELS FOR THE APPLICATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS IN PRIVATE LAW
A. THE POTENTIAL MODELS
It is possible to build four principle theoretical models for the determination
of the influence of constitutional28 human rights on relations between private
26 See F. Raday, "Privatization of Human Rights' and Abuse of Power" (1994) Mishpatim
23 21.
27 There is a great deal of literature on this topic. See, inter alia, Clapham, "The
'Drittwirkung' of the Convention" in R. St. J. MacDonald, F. Matscher and H. Petzold,
eds., The European System for the Protection of Human Rights (1993) 163; J. H.
Garvey, "Private Power and the Constitution" (1993) 10 Const. Comm. 311; R. S. Kay,
"The State Action Doctrine, The Public-Private Distinction, and the Independence of
Constitutional Law" (1993) 10 Const. Comm. 331; U. Scheuner, "Fundamental Rights
and the Protection of the Individual Against Social Groups and Powers in the
Constitutional System of the Federal Republic of Germany" in Rene Cassin, ed.,
Amicorum Discipulorumque Liber, Vol. III (Paris: ltditions A. Pedone, 1971) 253;
J.D.B. Mitchell, "Some Aspects of the Protection of Individuals Against Private Power
in the United Kingdom" in Rene Cassin, ibid. 235; 0. Espersen, "Human Rights and
Relations Between Individuals, in Rene Cassin, ibid 177; Clyde W. Summers, "The
Privatization of Personal Freedoms and the Enrichment of Democracy: Some-Lessons
from Labor Law" (1986) U. Ill. L. Rev. 689.
28 This section is based on A. Barak, "Protected Human Rights and Private Law" in I.
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parties. The first model designates that constitutional human rights - which
were defined and determined in the constitution or in a basic law - apply
directly in private law, and directly influence private relationships (direct
application model). According to this model, human rights are "protected" not
only against the government, but also against private parties. A violation of a
protected human right by a private party is likely to beget particular results
which would not occur in the absence of the constitutional character of the
violated right. Thus, for example, if Reuven shouts and disturbs a meeting or
proceeding, he thus infringes Shimon's right, a participant in the meeting or
proceeding, and Shimon is granted a right against Reuven. Similarly, if Reuven
is prepared to sell his product to Shimon but not to Leah, he harms Leah's right
to equality, and she is entitled to relief against Shimon.
The second model states that constitutional human rights are applicable only
in public law. They are directed against the government, and the government
alone (non-application model). According to this model, constitutional human
rights do not have any application - direct or indirect - in private law. A court
is not entitled to enforce them in private law: the rights are protected as against
the government, but not against private parties. In the realm of private law, the
regular laws continue to apply as they did before human rights were granted
constitutional status. Thus, for example, if Reuven disturbs a meeting or
proceeding, the right against him is the government's - within the framework
of penal or administrative law - or the owner's, the use of whose property was
harmed. Reuven, who refuses to sell his products to Leah, is free to do so since
Leah's right of equality is not aimed at him. If Reuven makes a contract with
Shimon limiting Reuven's freedom of occupation and breaches this contract,
Shimon has the usual contract remedies against Reuven, subject to the claim that
the contract is against public policy. This claim was available to Reuven before
human rights were granted constitutional status, and it is available to him in its
original form also after the change in the status of human rights.
The third and fourth models are mid-points between the two extreme models.
The third model states that protected human rights apply in private law.
However, this application is not direct, but indirect (indirect application model).
1993).
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Protected human rights do not directly permeate private law "in and of
themselves," but rather by means of private law doctrines (either through
existing doctrines or through new doctrines created for the purpose of public law
"absorption"). Reuven who refuses to sell his products to Leah is likely to be
responsible to her for conducting negotiations with a lack of good faith.
The fourth model states that constitutional human rights are protected only
against the government. They have no application (direct or indirect) in
relationships between private parties. Nonetheless, the "government" also
includes the judiciary (application to judiciary model). Accordingly, the
judiciary is prohibited from developing common law (in the general normative
area) or granting relief in a specific case (in the particular normative area) that
harms a constitutional human right. According to this model, if Reuven is
obligated to Shimon not to sell his products to Leah, and Reuven breaches this
obligation towards Shimon, Shimon will not be entitled to the remedy of specific
performance or damages. The reason for this is: if the court orders Reuven to
fulfil his obligations regarding Shimon, the court will harm Leah's right to
equality - a right against the State, and breached by the court's action.
These are the four principle models. Occasionally there will be conflicts
between the models. Thus, for example, the direct application model and the
indirect application model contradict the non-application model. Other models
may co-exist. Thus, for example, it is possible to follow the indirect application
model, and only if this does not give an appropriate solution, one can move to
the direct application model. It also is possible to blend the first three models
with the fourth model. Indeed, the application to judiciary model can be used to
complete all the other models. It is possible to describe, of course, additional
models. I have focused on these four models because each of them exists in
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B. DIRECT APPLICATION MODEL: ARGUMENTS FOR AND
AGAINST
1. Textual Arguments for Direct Application
The point of departure of the direct application model is the language of the
constitutional provision. Israel's Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation states that
"every citizen or resident of the State is entitled to engage in every occupation,
profession or business."29 Similarly, Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty
states that "no harm may be done to a person's property,"30 and that "every man
is entitled to defend his life, body and dignity."31 These provisions and others are
drafted in broad language. It cannot be deduced from them - not explicitly nor
by inference - that they are only directed against the government. A substantive
difference exists between this "open" formulation of human rights and the
formula which occasionally appears in constitutions, in which human rights are
only directed against the government. 32 Accordingly, from a "textual" perspec-
tive, an interpretation of basic laws which recognizes the direct application of
rights is possible.
Moreover, Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty states that the goal of the
law is "to protect human dignity and liberty, to anchor in a basic law the State
of Israel's appreciation of them as a Jewish and democratic state."33 This goal is
not limited solely to protecting human dignity and liberty as against the
government. This goal is general, and it is realized both in the protection of
rights against the government and in protecting them in relationships between
private parties. According to the fundamental principles clause,34 basic rights of
people in Israel are based "on the recognition of the worth of man, the sanctity
29 Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, para. 3.
30 Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, para. 3.
31 Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, para. 4.
32 An example is provided by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which states:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or of the right
of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances."
3 Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, para. IA.
34 Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, para. 1.
Vol. III, No.2
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of his life, and of his freedom." The recognition of the worth of man, the sanctity
of his life and of his freedom justifies recognition of the application of human
rights in private law. The danger of harm to the worth of man, the sanctity of his
life and his choices is liable to come not only from the government but also from
violent private parties. It is true that Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation states
in its "respect clause" that "every authority of the government authorities must
respect the freedom of occupation of every person or resident,"35 and a similar
provision exists in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.36 Nonetheless,
respect clauses are not judicial "presumptions," from which it must be inferred
that basic laws apply exclusively to relationships with the government alone.
The purpose of these provisions is to establish the normative super-legislative
status of basic laws, and their existence as a source of judicial authority and not
just political rights. The respect clause is an insufficient basis from which to
deduce a negative rule regarding the application of human rights in private law.
2. Substantive Arguments for Direct Application
The textual arguments that arise from the text of the Israeli Basic Laws allow
for the application of constitutional human rights to relationships between
private actors, but they do not mandate this conclusion. To this end substantive
arguments are available. The first - and the most important of them - is the
argument that the danger to human rights does not only emanate from the
government, and that it must be recognized that grave danger to human rights
emanates from non-governmental bodies. Indeed, there are even those who claim
that in democratic regimes, the danger of harm to human rights from private
parties is greater at times than the danger of harm from the government.37
Appropriate protection of human rights requires, therefore, a general test, which
extends across both the public and private sector. The second substantive
35 Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, para. 5.
36 Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, para. 11.
37 See R. A. MacDonald, "Postscript and Prelude - The Jurisprudence of the Charter:
Eight Theses" (1982) 4 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. 321 at 347. ("In our day, the most grievous
and most frequent abuses of civil liberties occur in the exercise of private power. The
occasions for discriminatory state action are both comparatively few and subject to
relatively formalized procedures for their exercise, when contrasted with an employer's
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argument, which is simply the flip side of the first argument, is that human rights
are essentially "liberties" anchored in the autonomy of the individual will and
in the unity of the person and his dignity. These are likely to be harmed not only
by government actions but also by the acts of private parties. The third
substantive argument, which is dogmatic, is that it is not appropriate to
distinguish, in a given judicial system, between different normative gradations
of the same human right. What point is there, on the one hand, in preventing the
legislature from enacting a statute permitting one private party to infringe the
human rights of another private party, but on the other hand permitting - in the
absence of prohibiting legislation - one private party to infringe the same basic
rights of another private party?
The fourth argument is pragmatic. The true alternative to the direct
application model is only the non-application model. If this model is not found
to be suitable, the judicial system is liable to find itself in the framework of the
indirect application and application to judiciary models. These two models create
difficult and undesirable distinctions, the fourth argument states; it is preferable
to take the "clean" and clear path, and if the non-application model does not
seem to be suitable, it is preferable to go "all the way" and recognize the direct
application model as the preferable model.
3. Textual Arguments Against Direct Application
The departure points for the contrary textual argument are those same
provisions in the Basic Laws which indicate that the Basic Laws are aimed
solely at the government. First, there are human rights drafted such that only
government acts can infringe them. Thus, for example, Basic Law: Human
Dignity and Liberty states that "There is to be no burdening and no limiting of
a person's liberty by imprisonment, arrest and extradition or in any other
manner."3 "Imprisonment," "arrest," and "extradition" are government acts.
Second, alongside recognition of "open" human rights, the basic laws determine
the "limitations" which may be placed on human rights. These are the
"limitation clauses" in the basic laws. The Basic Laws do not have a "limitation
clause" regarding relations between fellow citizens. It therefore appears that
38 Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, para. 5.
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Basic Laws only apply against the government, because it is impossible to
recognize human rights between private parties without recognizing a limitation
of one human right arising from the existence of a different human right. Third,
if the Basic Laws apply also to relations between private parties, it means that
they not only grant one private party a right against another private party, but
they also impose obligations on one private party towards another private party.
But the case law holds that a human right cannot be negated or limited except by
legislation explicitly stating as much.39 In the absence of an explicit provision
applying Basic Laws to relations between private parties, the Basic Laws should
not be interpreted as applying to these relations. Fourth, Basic Laws include
respect clauses, according to which "every authority of the government
authorities is obligated to respect"4 the basic rights set forth in them. The
implication is that Basic Laws are directed solely at the government and not at
private parties.
4. Substantive Arguments Against Direct Application
The first substantive argument is that constitutional dealings in human rights
are always vis-d-vis the government.4' The fear is that the government - either
the legislature or the executive - will infringe human rights, and the sole way
to overcome this is by giving "super-legislative" (i.e. constitutional) normative
status to human rights. Indeed, guaranteed human rights in relations between
private parties require no constitutional provision because regular legislation or
common law is sufficient. Constitutional treatment of human rights is by its very
essence treatment of human rights in relation to the government.
The second substantive argument is that Basic Laws were intended to grant
private parties basic constitutional rights. If we apply the Basic Laws provisions
also to relations between private parties, we will find that Basic Laws do not
39 See H.C. 252/77, Bevugnee v. City of Tel Aviv, P.D. 32 (1) 404, 415; H.C. 337/81,
supra note 25.
40 Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, para. 5; Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty,
para. 11.
41 See K. Swinton, "Application of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms" in W.
Tarnopolsky and G. Beaudoin, eds., The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms




HeinOnline  -- 3 Rev. Const. Stud. 230 1996
231 Justice Aharon Barak
only grant rights, but they also negate rights - since the right of one private
party is the obligation of another private party. We will find that the negation of
basic rights is raised to a constitutional level. This result is untenable. Basic
Laws were intended to grant private parties protected basic rights, not to take
these rights away.
The third substantive argument is linked to and arises from the second
argument. According to this third argument, the application of human rights set
forth in the Basic Laws to relations between private parties requires, by the
nature of matters, balancing between competing human rights, since one
person's right is likely to infringe another person's right. Since the Basic Laws
do not contain "limitation clauses" regarding the limitation of one person's right
arising from the right of another person, the obvious result is that judges will
have to create judicial "limitation clauses." Thus judges would acquire enormous
constitutional power, without any constitutional guidance. Moreover, when the
Knesset sought to limit human rights as against the government, it set forth
"limitation clauses." The absence of a "limitation clause" in relations between
private parties militates against balancing between human rights set forth in the
Basic Laws. In the absence of this balancing, there is no possibility of applying
constitutional human rights to relations between private parties.
C. NON-APPLICATION MODEL: ARGUMENTS FOR AND
AGAINST
1. Arguments For Non-Application
The textual arguments supporting the non-application model are the same
textual arguments which argue against the direct application model.42 The same
is true for the substantive arguments.43 Indeed, the non-application model is the
complete opposite of the direct application model. At the base of this model
stands the assumption that a formal constitution is intended - in everything
related to human rights - to protect private parties against the government, and
it is not at all interested in dealing with the rights of one private party against
42 See text associated with notes 38-40.
43 See text associated with note 41.
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another private party. The latter relationship is regulated from time immemorial
by private law."
Moreover, the end result of application of constitutional provisions regarding
human rights to relations between private parties is the infringement of human
rights. If the prohibition on discrimination, for example, applies also to relations
between private actors, does this mean that a testator is not entitled to discrimi-
nate between heirs, and a seller is not entitled to discriminate between buyers?
And what will become of the autonomy of individual will - and particularly
freedom of contract - if the constitutional provisions regarding human rights
will apply also to relations between private parties? And if we say that the
solution is balancing between the various human rights, how will this balancing
be done? The constitution - which sets forth a balancing formula regarding
relations between the government and private parties - does not set forth a
balancing formula in relationships between private parties. Will the balancing
formula regarding relations between private parties be identical to that applicable
between the government and private parties? Will we say that everything that the
government is not entitled to do, private parties are also not entitled to do? This
answer is untenable, for many things that private parties are entitled to do (such
as discriminate among heirs), the government is not entitled to do (to establish
discrimination in legislation). And if we say that the balancing formula in
conflicts between private parties' rights is different, what is its substance? It is
not at all appropriate for supporters of the non-application model to argue that
a court establish this balancing formula, whose end result is the infringement of
human rights themselves.
Accordingly, in everything regarding relations between private parties, we
must return to private law and the accepted scales therein, without any influence
or permeation of constitutional provisions, which remain entirely in the public
sphere. Of course, the borderline between public and private law is not clear and
impenetrable. There are reciprocal relations between public law and private law.
In consolidating common law private law doctrines, the judge will consider
public law. This consideration solely reflects the need to survey the entire
structure of society, law and opinion, and is not based on the application -
44 See Swinton, supra, note 41; Raday, supra, note 26.
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direct or indirect - of constitutional provisions regarding human rights in
private law. Justice McIntyre of the Supreme Court addressed this point in the
Canadian case which decided that the provisions in the Canadian Charter
regarding rights and liberties do not apply to private law:45
This is a distinct issue from the question whether the judiciary ought to apply and
develop the principles of the common law in a manner consistent with the fundamental
values enshrined in the Constitution. The answer to this question must be in the
affirmative. In this sense, then, the Charter is far from irrelevant to private litigants
whose disputes fall to be decided at common law. But this is different from the
proposition that one private party owes a constitutional duty to another, which
proposition underlies the purported assertion of Charter causes of action or Charter
defences between individuals.
According to this approach, a decision which grants a remedy to a private
party against another private party is not measured against the standards of
constitutional provisions, and the government's obligation to respect the rights
of private parties does not impose on courts the obligation as well to respect the
rights of private parties. The court decides private disputes - this and no more.
Accordingly, the court is likely to decide that a contract which infringes human
rights (such as freedom of occupation) is contrary to public policy and therefore
void, but it will do this in the same manner as it did in the past, without
constitutionalizing human rights.
2. Arguments Against Non-Application
The arguments in favor of the direct application model46 are the same as the
arguments against the non-application model. The danger to human rights
emanates not only from the government, but also from private parties, and
primarily strong private parties, such as certain private corporations. If a small
city is not entitled to discriminate - because it falls within the definition of
"government" - why should a large corporation be entitled to do so? Moreover,
if we say that human rights in a formal constitution are aimed at the government,
what is the rule regarding a legislative enactment which sets forth rights and
45 In the case of Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union, Local 580 v. Dolphin
Delivery Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573 at 603.
46 See text associated with notes 30-37.
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obligations in private law, such as the Sale Law, Guarantee Law or Agency
Law? Is the legislature free to determine their contents at will without the
constitutional limitations set forth in the limitations clause? It seems that the
answer is that the law is a government act and, accordingly, constitutional
limitations apply to it, even if the contents of the law relate solely to relations
between private parties.
But if so, why does a similar rule not apply to the development by courts of
the common law concerning relations between private parties? Is this not
"judicial legislation"47 to which constitutional limitations must directly apply?
In either case: if constitutional provisions regarding human rights are directed
also against the judiciary, and it is restricted in the development of common law
concerning relations between private parties and the government, why would this
restriction not also apply - just as it applies to the legislature - to the
development of common law concerning relations between private parties? And
if we say that constitutional provisions regarding human rights are not at all
directed against the judiciary, is it reasonable that a court will be able -to develop
the common law regarding the right of a private party against the government
without constitutional limitations? Indeed, the conception of a court as a
government body subject to constitutional provisions indicates that the
non-application model cannot stand, since even if it prevents the infiltration of
human rights constitutional provisions by means of the direct application model,
in the end it will be "entangled" in constitutional provisions by means of the
court as government authority and, if so, it is preferable to reach the appropriate
result by the direct application model than by the application to the judiciary
model.
If we say, however, that the non-application model stands up even against
the judicial application model, the outcome is difficult and inappropriate; what
the state does not accomplish "directly" (by means of legislation) it will
accomplish "indirectly" (by means of the courts). Either way, private party rights
are not suitably protected. Furthermore, if constitutional provisions on human
rights do not apply in relations between private parties, what is the law regarding
the government when it operates in the private law realm? Do constitutional
47 Forjudicial legislation, see A. Barak, Judicial Discretion (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1989) at 147.
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provisions on human rights apply to government in these instances? The
non-application model is likely to provide contradictory responses, and give rise
to undesirable results.
One possible answer is that constitutional provisions in fact only deal with
human rights against the government, and when the government acts in the
private law area it acts as a private party and not as the government. This
response - the critics claim - is unsatisfactory.48 It is not reasonable that the
state can discriminate, infringe the right of speech, right of movement and the
other human rights, just because it has changed "cloaks." There has been no
change of identity and it is appropriate that constitutional limitations apply. The
obligations of the state towards private parties under the constitution are the
"personal law" of the state, and it takes this law with it in all its endeavours.
To overcome these arguments, the non-application model is likely to also
take the opposite position: that the constitutional provisions on human rights
indeed apply also where the state acts in private law. This response opens the
door to a variety of problems and questions: How will the "government" be
defined for this matter? Is a government corporation the "government" for
purposes of constitutional provisions? And how do we reconcile the application
of constitutional human rights provisions to the government when it acts in
private law with the various arguments against the application of constitutional
human rights provisions in private law?
Take the argument that an application like this infringes the autonomy of
individual will, because it places obligations on the individual. If constitutional
human rights provisions apply to the state in private law, they surely are not
limited solely to the imposition of obligations, but rather also grant rights. The
state's right is the obligation of the private party. How, if so, do we reconcile this
conclusion - which the non-application model is prepared to accept - with the
claim that this result is disastrous for human rights?
Further, take the argument that constitutional human rights provisions should
not be applied in private law because the constitution does not set forth a
48 See sources cited infra, note 95.
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limitation clause restricting human rights. How can this argument be overcome
when the state acts in the private law area? The limitation clause - which
applies to the government's legislative activities - does not apply to the state
in private law. What is, then, the limitation which will apply in the private law
framework? And if we say that courts will formulate balancing formulas suitable
for relationships in private law between the state (as a private party) and other
private parties, why can the courts not develop these formulas - or similar ones
- for relationships between private parties?
D. INDIRECT APPLICATION MODEL: ARGUMENTS FOR AND
AGAINST
1. Arguments For Indirect Application
The indirect application model - like the direct application model -
recognizes the application of human rights set forth in the constitution to
relations between private parties. Most of the arguments supporting the direct
application model49 also support the indirect application model. According to its
supporters,5° the advantage of this model is that it has an answer to some of the
criticism levelled against the direct application model. The departure point of the
indirect application model is that private law - which deals with relations
between private parties - has always considered human rights. At the base of
private law rules stand the human rights of personhood, self-realization, and
dignity. The specific private law rules - like protection of one's good name,
property, and assets - reflect rights of the private party (as against the state and
against other private parties). The "value" concepts - like "good faith,"
"reasonableness," "negligence" - reflect, inter alia, an appropriate balance
between opposing human rights. The right of one private party to freedom of
action confronts the right of another private party to bodily integrity.
The balance is found in various "institutions" of private law, such as
negligence.51 Another private law institution which "absorbs" human rights
49 See text associated with notes 30-37.
50 See sources cited infra, note 95.
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originating in the constitution is "public policy. 5 2 According to the claims of the
proponents of the indirect application model, "public policy" reflects the
position of constitutional human rights. The freedom to make a contract is a
constitutional freedom and the freedom of occupation is a constitutional
freedom. When Reuven makes a contract with Shimon to limit freedom of
occupation, there is a confrontation between the various liberties. From time
immemorial these confrontations have been solved within the framework of the
"public policy" principle, 3 which weighed conflicting rights according to their
relative status in the constitutional system. Indeed, "public policy" is the channel
through which constitutional values flow into private law.54
When private law gives expression to human rights, it does not create a
special system of human rights in private law; there are not two human rights
systems, that of private law and that of public law. There is one human rights
system. In the past, human rights were anchored in common law rules "which
were not inscribed in a book";5 today they are anchored in a "super-legislative"
norm. In the past, common law human rights "infiltrated" private law by means
of private law "value terms"; now constitutional human rights themselves have
"infiltrated" private law by means of these terms. The difference in constitu-
tional status is likely to bring about a difference in outcome.
Take, for example, a private employer who fires an employee because of a
political opinion the employee expressed. This termination is likely to be illegal.
When the status of the right of expression is not constitutional, the illegal
termination is likely to carry with it the sanction of damages, but not of specific
performance. In contrast, if the status of the right of expression is raised to a
super-legislative level, the employee is likely to win the remedy of specific
performance. Raising the normative status of the right of expression increases
its power in private law, and enables the court to grant the remedy of specific
52 Contracts Law (General Part), 5733-1973, para. 30.
53 See M. Goldberg, "Contractual Restraint of An Employee" Mechakrei Mishpat 5
(5747) 7; A.D. Hermon, Public Policy and Restrictions on Freedom of Occupation in
The Looking-Glass of Israeli and British Case Law, Yitzhak Kahan Book (Tel Aviv:
Papirus, 1989) 393.
54 See Civ. App. 294/91, supra, note 5.
55 H.C. 243/62, supra note 17.
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performance which it did not recognize in the past. Similarly, a restaurant owner
who refuses to proffer services for discriminatory reasons is likely to be deemed
to be conducting negotiations in "good faith" if the right to equality is only
common law, because, as such, the right does not have the power to overcome
the restaurant owner's freedom of contract. The same restaurant owner is likely
deemed to be conducting negotiations with a lack of "good faith" if the right to
equality is constitutional. The advantage of the indirect application model over
the direct application model is that it makes use of private law tools. These are
likely to be old tools, imbued with new content, or new tools, created by the
private law with private law techniques, for the purpose of giving expression to
the new content.
2. Arguments Against Indirect Application
The arguments against the indirect application model are, in principle,
identical to the arguments against the direct application model.56 Surely, if
constitutional human rights are protected only as against the government, they
are not applicable - either directly or indirectly - to relations between private
parties. The indirect application model attempts to ease the "digestion" of
application of rights from public law in private law, but this easing is misplaced,
because at its base the idea is not worthwhile. If human dignity, liberty and
property are constitutional rights against the government, how do they succeed
in shaping public policy whose concern is relations between private parties?
Why is a contract which limits freedom of occupation contrary to public policy,
if freedom of occupation in principle is not directed against other private parties,
but only against the government?
E. APPLICATION TO THE JUDICIARY MODEL: ARGUMENTS FOR
AND AGAINST
1. Arguments For Indirect Application
The application to the judiciary model is different from the previous three
models. Those are located on one continuum, while the fourth model (applica-
56 See text associated with notes 38-41.
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tion to the judiciary model) represents a separate category.57 Its primary
importance is in situations where the text of the constitutional provision
indicates that the human right is directed against the government, and the
government alone. The constitutional provision on the human right in such a
situation is directed also against the judiciary, and it obliges the courts to
develop common law rules, to interpret legislation or to give specific relief
which will give expression to the constitutional human right and not contradict
it. Thus, for example, in a legal system where the constitutional right to freedom
of expression is drafted in language which prohibits the government from
infringing freedom of expression, the courts must develop the common law in
which the rules of defamation will not infringe freedom of expression. On this
basis it was decided in the United States that the common law on defamation
must recognize the defense of negligence to defamation against a public
personality.58
Indeed, the court is an arm of the government. When the court speaks, the
state speaks, and when the court acts, the state acts. The judiciary is a govern-
ment authority, and human rights must receive protection from it as well. In a
legal system in which the legislature's enactments are limited in scope and must
operate within the framework of the limitations clause, there is no reason for
releasing the common law, the creation of the judiciary, from all limitation.
Moreover, if the common law is subject to constitutional basic rights,
individual law must also be subject to them. There is no distinction, in this
regard, between a general normative act of the judiciary, which develops
common law, and an individual normative act of the judiciary, which grants
relief in a dispute between private parties. When a court issues an order
enforcing a discriminatory contract, it places the power of the state - which acts
via various means, including the principles of contempt of court - at the
disposal of one private party who is infringing another private party's right to
equality. Thus it violates the government's duty not to discriminate. 9 This result
57 See Peter E. Quint, "Free Speech and Private Law in German Constitutional Theory"
48 Mar. L. Rev. 247 (1989).
58 As indeed the Supreme Court decided in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964).
59 See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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should be prevented, because the principle of the rule of law or, more aptly, the
rule of the constitution, also applies to the judiciary.60
2. Arguments Against Indirect Application
The application to the judiciary model is open to much criticism. First, when
the judiciary grants relief in a private dispute, it is not subject to constitutional
human rights. It acts as a neutral body which determines rights and obligations.
Indeed, if Reuven is entitled to discriminate against Shimon, and the court
enforces this entitlement - by declaratory judgment, damages, enforcement or
invalidation - the court does not infringe upon the government's obligation not
to discriminate. All the court does is recognize the non-application of the
equality principle in private law. Justice McIntyre addressed this when he
stated:6
While in political science terms it is probably acceptable to treat the courts as one of
the three fundamental branches of Government, that is, legislative, executive, and
judicial, I cannot equate for the purposes of Charter application the order of a court
with an element of governmental action. This is not to say that the courts are not bound
by the Charter. The courts are, of course, bound by the Charter as they are bound by
all law. It is their duty to apply the law, but in doing so they act as neutral arbiters, not
as contending parties involved in a dispute.
Indeed, if we see a judicial order - the result of a decree in a dispute
between private parties - as an order against which the constitutional
prohibition is directed, then all the constitutional rights of private parties against
the government will be transformed into rights applicable between private
parties. Thus the goal of the constitutional order will be frustrated. To overcome
this argument, the court is likely to create distinctions between instances in
which it merely recognizes the freedom of action of private parties in private law
(in which it is not subject to constitutional prohibitions), and instances in which
it acts as the government (and in which it is subject to constitutional prohibi-
tions).
60 See Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 3rd ed., (Toronto: Carswell, 1992) at 842.
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If indeed the court will seek to make these distinctions - and comparative
law points to extensive attempts in this direction - then the application to the
judiciary model will meet with a second critique. This critique states that
distinctions between instances in which the court acts as a "neutral arbiter"
outside the constitutional prohibition, and instances in which it acts as
government, subject to constitutional prohibition, is artificial. Why is an order
enforcing a discriminatory contract an act of government violating the state's
duty not to discriminate,61 but an order decreeing that the bylaws of a discrimina-
tory club are valid not violate the state's obligation not to discriminate?63 Let us
assume the case of a restaurant owner who refuses to give service for racist
reasons, and the discriminated-against person who refuses to leave the place. The
restaurant owner turns to the court and requests an eviction order; does the court
- acting as the government - violate its obligation not to discriminate by
giving the eviction order?
6 4
Indeed, every attempt to draw reasonable distinctions between situations in
which the court acts in disputes between private parties will ultimately fail. It is
therefore necessary to select one of two conclusions: one conclusion is that every
act of a court, resolving disputes between private parties, is a government action
subject to constitutional human rights. This approach opposes the language of
the constitution, and is not suitable. The other conclusion is that every act by a
court which decides a dispute between private parties is not deemed to be a
government action against which protected human rights are directed. Thus the
fourth model reaches its demise.
III. COMPARATIVE LAW
A. THE WEALTH OF COMPARATIVE LAW
The application of constitutional human rights in private law is a problem
that has arisen in many legal systems.65 It exists regarding all constitutional
62 As was decided in Shelley, supra, note 59.
63 See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
(A Peterson v. Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
65 See Michael J. Horan, "Contemporary Constitutionalism and Legal Relationships
Between Individuals" (1976) 25 Inst. Comp. L.Q. 848.
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human rights, and primarily regarding the right to equality.66 Comparative law
is an important source of inspiration for the Israeli jurist:67 "By comparison with
your counterpart you learn to know yourself better."68 With the assistance of
comparative law we succeed in separating ourselves from thought patterns we
have become accustomed to, and from distinctions that appear essential to us. In
their stead comes a comprehensive view as to the essence of the order and its
goals, and its place in the systematic and social structure. By means of
comparative law, our horizons are broadened.69 We consider additional
possibilities and new solutions, and understand better the normative potential
concealed in the local order. Surely comparative law is a guide to finding the
appropriate solution. It grants comfort to the judge and gives him the feeling that
he is treading on safe ground, and it also gives legitimacy to the chosen solution.
Nonetheless, it is necessary to be careful of overreliance on comparative law.
First, recourse to comparative law is merely permissive, and does not have any
obligatory basis. Second, a fitting comparison is only possible if the foreign legal
institution or arrangement to which the expositor turns fills a function similar to
that filled by the parallel local institution or arrangement.7 ° I addressed this in
one case, where I stated:7'
Frequently, before the judge decides on the content and scope of a legal institution
found in his system, he will turn to other legal systems for the purposes of comparison.
The purpose of this comparison is inspiration. An essential condition for this
inspiration is that the legal institutions which are compared are fit for comparison, that
is to say, that they are based on common fundamental assumptions and come to realize
common goals.
Third, the comparison is intended to unsettle thoughts. It must not become a
source of imitation and self-denial. The final decision is always "local," and
66 See T. Koopmans, ed., Constitutional Protection of Equality (Leyden: A.W. Sijthoff,
1975) at 227.
67 See Civ. App. 546/78 Kupat Am Bank Inc. v. Hendels, P.D. 34 (3) 57, 67.
68 Fur. Hrg. 40/80 Kenig v. Cohen, P.D. 36 (3) 701, 707.
69 Civ. App. 295/81 Estate ofSharon Gavriel v. Gavriel, P.D. 36 (4) 533,542.
70 See K. Zweigert and H. Kotz, An Introduction to Comparative Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1992).
71 Civ. App. 546/78, supra note 67 at 67. See also H.C. 428/86 Barzilai v. Government
ofIsrael, P.D. 40 (3) 505, 600.
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comparative law by its very nature can only fill a secondary position. With this
caveat I turn to several systems in which one of the models I addressed is
accepted.
B. DIRECT APPLICATION MODEL
1. Switzerland
The direct application model is accepted in Switzerland." In several cantons
it is based on explicit language in the canton constitution; in the remaining
cantons - and on the federal level - there is no explicit provision,74 and direct
application was accepted by jurists and courts by means of interpretation. The
direct application model is called Drittwirkung der Grundrechte. This is a phrase
borrowed from German literature.75 Drittwirkung means "impact on a third
party." The private party possessing a constitutional right is one party, the
government is the second party, and every other private party is the "third party."
According to the Drittwirkung doctrine, constitutional human rights act both
vertically - between private parties and the state - as well as horizontally -
between private parties. The need to recognize the relationship arises primarily
from the recognition that the danger of infringement of human rights does not
only come from the state, and that great danger to human rights is perceived to
emanate from private power centers. This recognition is also based on the
conception that constitutional human rights are super-principles which operate
throughout the entire system. Accordingly, it was decided that freedom of
religion exists not only as to the state, but also in relations between private
citizens,76 and it was decided that anyone who participates in a meeting has a
right against another person who infringes his freedom of association by vocal
72 See J.P. Moller, Elemente Einer Schweizerischen Grundrechtstheorie (Bern: Stempfli,
1982); Haeflin and Hailer, Schweizerisches Bundesstaatsrecht (1988) at 344. This is
the controlling view. It has opponents; see J.-F. Aubert, Trait6 de droit constitutionnel
suisse, 3 vols. (Bd. I1, 2967) (Neuchatel: tditions Ides et Calendes, 1967-82) 626.
73 See Constitution of the Canton of Jura, para. 14 (2), which states that each person must
use his basic rights in a manner which respects the basic rights of others.
74 The 1977 Proposed Amendment to the Federal Constitution, para. 25, contains an
explicit provision on the matter.
75 See text below associated with notes 79-82
76 See BGE 4, 434 FF and BGE 86 11 365 FF..
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disturbances." Similarly, an agreement among car importers not to place
advertisements in a newspaper is characterized as illegal because, inter alia, it
infringes the newspaper's freedom of expression. 8
2. Germany
The "impact on third parties" (Drittwirkung) theory was developed in
Germany. The accepted opinion is that human rights set forth in a basic law
(Grundgesetz) apply not only to relations between private parties and the
government in public law, but also to relationships between private parties in
private law. The constitutional basic rights have, therefore, "impact on a third
party." Opinions differ as to whether this application is direct (without an
intermediary) or indirect (through an intermediary). Scholars and courts are
divided on this issue. Nipperdey79 - one of the great German jurists - and the
Supreme Court for Labor Law (which he headed) adopted the direct application
model.8 0 Durig,1 and the Constitutional Supreme Court (the Bundesver-
fassungsgericht) adopted the indirect model."
According to the approach of direct application adherents, constitutional
human rights influence the legal system in its entirety." Human rights came to
grant the individual "breadth of action" and to protect him from extremist
powers. This power in the past was primarily the State's power, but it is not the
only power likely to do harm in the protected area of private parties. This harm
can come from non-state powers, and private parties must also be protected
77 See BGE 101 IV 172 ES.
79 See MUller, supra, note 72 at 84.
79 See Enneccerus - Nipperdey, Allegmeiner Teil des Burgerlichen Rechts 93, 15th ed.,
Vol.1 (1959); Leisner also deals a great deal with this topic: see Leisner, Grundrecht
und Privatrecht (1960).
s0 See Kenneth M. Lewan, "The Significance of Constitutional Rights for Private Law:
Theory and Practice in West Germany" (1968) 17 Int. Comp. L.Q. 571.
81 See Lewan, ibid. at 576.
82 See Quint, supra, note 57 and also Donald P. Kommers, The Constitutional
Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany (Durham: Duke University Press,
1989).
93 See H. van Mangoldt and F. Klein, Das Bonner Grundgesetz, 3rd ed. (Munich: F.
Vahlen, 1985) at 132 (Band 1).
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against them - by means of human rights granted by the constitution. These
apply, therefore, not only against the government, but also against other private
parties. In relations between private parties, various human rights may conflict.
Thus, for example, the freedom of contract of one person is likely to conflict
with the freedom of expression of another. This conflict must be resolved by
balancing the conflicting values. This balancing is done on a constitutional level,
and it is employed directly in private law.
This can be illustrated by several decisions handed down in Germany:
Reuven had a report on Shimon's health, and he gave the document to an
insurance company. It was decided that this breached Shimon's constitutional
right to dignity and personal development - protected by paragraphs 1 and 2 of
the Basic Law - and that he is entitled to relief from the insurance company.
4
In its reasoning, the court stated that the human rights set forth in paragraphs 1
and 2 of the basic law come "to secure a basic right, which obtains not only
regarding the state and its organizations, but also in private law relationships
against every person." In another instance, the plaintiff's picture was published
in connection with drugs, and for this he sued the distributor. According to
German private law, in such circumstances the plaintiff is entitled to damages
only if he can prove pecuniary harm. This type of harm was not proven, but
nonetheless the Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshoj) held that the plaintiff was
entitled to damages because the plaintiffs constitutional right to dignity and
personal development was breached.85
An additional example is the case where in a collective agreement a lower
salary was fixed for women than for men doing the same work. It was held that
paragraph 3 of the Basic Law sets forth the equality principle, and that this
principle applies directly to private law. Accordingly, the Supreme Court for
Labor Law voided the provision of the collective agreement.8 6 In another
instance an employer announced that it was giving its employees gifts for
Christmas, and that women whose husbands also worked at the factory would
receive two-thirds of the gift. The Supreme Court for Labor Law decided that
this was prohibited discrimination, which directly led to the cancellation of the
84 See 24 BGHZ 72, 76.
85 See 26 BGHZ 349.
86 See I BAG 258.
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gifts.8 7 An example from another area is the case in which resident doctors
signed a contract with a hospital, and according to the contract their residency
ended if they got married. The Supreme Court for Labor Law decided that this
contract provision violated the protections the constitution gave to the family,
and accordingly voided it.88 In another instance a women sued her husband
because he brought his mistress into the family's home. The Constitutional
Supreme Court granted her an order enjoining the mistress to stay away from the
home, and in its reasoning explained that its conclusion was based on the
constitutional provisions regarding the special protections the Constitution
grants to the family.89
3. Other Countries
In India the direct application model is not developed. Constitutional human
rights are interpreted as placing obligations on the government and not on
private parties. Nonetheless, the equality provision in the Constitution
(paragraph 15) has been interpreted as applying also to private parties, and its
text is as follows:
(1) The state shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of
religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them.
(2) No citizen shall on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or
any of them be subject to any disability, liability, restriction or condition with
regard to -
(a) access to shops, public restaurants, hotels and places of public entertain-
ment, or...
On this basis it was determined that subsection (1) imposes an obligation on the
state, whereas subsection (2) imposes an obligation also on private parties.9" One
87 See 11 BAG 338.
8 See 4 BAG 274.
89 See BGH 360 6.
90 See K.C. Dwivedi, Right to Equality and the Supreme Court (New Dehli: Deep &
Deep, 1990) at 77. See also Durga Das Basu, Commentary of the Constitution ofIndia,
Vol. 1. (Calcutta: S.C. Sarkar, 1961) at 463: "Prohibition against discrimination on
ground of race even in public places managed by private individuals, places the Indian
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private party can sue another private party for breaching the constitutional
provision.9'
In the United States the direct application model is generally not accepted.
Human rights set forth in the Bill of Rights are directed - by the language of
the provisions - against the state. This does not apply to one provision (the 13th
Amendment) which, according to its terms, does not place an obligation on the
state. This provision states:
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof
the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any
place subject to their jurisdiction.
On the basis of this text it was held that the provision applies in private law, and
grants rights and obligations in private law.92
C. NON-APPLICATION MODEL
1. Canada
The non-application model is accepted in Canada. In the Dolphin Delivery
case, 93 the Supreme Court of Canada determined that human rights set forth in
the Canadian Charter are directed against the government, and it alone. The
provisions do not apply in private law, not directly and not indirectly. The
Canadian Supreme Court also does not accept the application to judiciary
model. 94 This resolved the argument between those siding with application
91 See M. Hidayatullah, ed., Constitutional Law ofIndia, Vol. 1 (New Dehli: Bar Council
of India Trust, 1984). The editor also proposes establishing that if a court issues a
judgment that contains prohibited discrimination, the judgment will be voided as a
government action. The editor proposes, therefore, that India adopt the fourth model
regarding human rights in private law. See also Deshpande, Supreme Court Review
[1981] All India Reports 1.
92 See L. Tribe, American Consitutional Law, 2nd ed. (Mineola: Foundation Press, 1987)
at 1688. See also Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1983); A.R. Amar and D.
Widawsky, "Child Abuse as Slavery: A Thirteenth Amendment Response to
Deshaney" (1992) 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1359.
93 Supra note 45.
94 Ibid.
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(direct or indirect) of constitutional provisions in private law95 and their
opponents.96 This decision received both praise97 and fierce criticism,9" but so
long as it remains unchanged, it reflects the accepted rule in Canada. The Court's
primary rationale was based on the Charter provision99 according to which the
Charter provisions apply to the Parliament and Government of Canada, and to
the Legislature and Government of each of the Canadian provinces. According
to the Court, by virtue of this provision, the rights and liberties set forth in the
Charter apply to the government whether it acts in public law (as ruler), or
whether it acts in private law (as private party); whether it acts pursuant to
legislation or pursuant to common law rules. In contrast, the Charter provisions
do not apply to private parties in their relationships among themselves, whatever
the source of their actions.
The Supreme Court of Canada has had occasion to deliberate on the
application of the Charter in two recent cases. In C.B.C. v. Dagenais,0 in the
context of a challenge to a court-ordered publication ban issued during criminal
proceedings, the Court seemed to move in the direction of the indirect model of
application. A majority of the Court held that the Charter applied indirectly to
court-ordered publication bans issued under the common law in light of the
95 See R. D. Gibson, "The Charter of Rights and the Private Sector" (1982-1983) 12 Man.
L.J. 213 ; B. Slattery, "Charter of Rights and Freedoms - Does it Bind Private
Persons" (1985) 63 Can. Bar. Rev. 148; Y. de Montigny, "Section 32 and Equality
Rights" in A. Bayefsky and M. Eberts, eds., Equality Rights and the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms (Toronto: Carswell, 1985) 565; A. McLellan and B. P. Elman,
"To Whom Does the Charter Apply? Some Recent Cases on Section 32" (1986) 24
Alberta L. Rev. 361; W. Lederman, "Democratic Parliaments, Independent Courts and
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms" (1985) 11 Queens L.J. 1.
96 See Hogg, supra, note 60 at 674; Swinton, supra note 41; J. Whyte, "Is the Private
Sector Affected by the Charter?" in L. Smith, ed., Righting the Balance: Canada's New
Equality Rights (Saskatoon: Canadian Human Rights Reporter, 1986) 145.
97 See Peter Hogg, "The Dolphin Delivery Case: The Application of the Charter to Private
Action" (1986) 51 Saskatchewan L. Rev. 273.
98 B. Slattery, "The Charter's Relevance to Private Litigation: Does Dolphin Deliver?"
(1987) 32 McGill L.J. 905; G. Otis, "The Charter, Private Action and the Supreme
Court" (1987) 19 Ottawa L.Rev. 71; A. Petter and A. Hutchinson, "Private
Rights/Public Wrongs: The Liberal Lie of the Charter" (1988) 38 U.T.L.J. 278.
99 Charter, section 32 (1).
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statement in Dolphin Delivery that judges ought to take into account Charter
values in the development of common law rules. But in the subsequent case of
Hill v. Church ofScientology, ,0' the Court made clear that it was not willing to
apply the Charter, even indirectly, to matters that were "purely private," here an
action for common law defamation. The approach in Dagenais was distinguish-
able because it arose in the "essentially public" criminal context. For cases
classified as "purely private," such as Hill, the Court would invoke Charter
values only to influence the development of the common law. The Court insisted
that the judiciary should be cautious in changing the common law so as to
conform with Charter values, leaving major changes to the legislature.'02
Accordingly, in Hill, the Supreme Court of Canada left the common law of
defamation intact, finding the existing common-law regime for the protection of
reputation consistent with the Charter guarantee of freedom of expression.
D. INDIRECT APPLICATION MODEL
1. Germany
The indirect application model has won recognition and development in
Germany. It is accepted by both constitutional0 3 and private law experts.
Larenz °4 and Flume'05 point to this as the proper model for the application of
constitutional human rights in relationships between private parties in private
law. This model was adopted in the decisions of the Constitutional Court in
Germany. 106
101 [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130.
102 Ibid. at para 95.
103 See T. Maunz and G. DUrig, Grundgesetz (Munich: Beck, 1958).
0 See K. Larenz, Lehrbuch des Schuldrechts, 11 ed. (Munich: Beck, 1975) at 48; K.
Larenz, Allgmeiner Teil des Deutschen Burgerlichen Rechts, 6 ed. (Munich: Beck,
1983) at 79.
j0s W. Flume, Allgemeiner Teil des Burgerlichen Rechts (Berlin: Springer, 1992) at 20.
06 See Kommers, supra note 82 at 368.
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The central decision is the Luth case."0 7 A film director named Harlan who,
during the Nazi era, directed the "Jd Siss" film, returned after the war to his
work and directed a new film. Luth, an activist in an association for mutual
understanding between Christians and Jews, spoke before film-makers and
called for a boycot of Harlan's new film. The film distributors turned to the civil
court and received an order barring Luth from any urging of the general public
not to see the film, and from requesting movie theatre owners and distributors
not to show it. The civil court determined that by his behaviour, Luth violated
the provisions of paragraph 826 to the Civil Code (B.G.B.), which states that
"everyone who intentionally causes damage to his fellow-man in a manner that
harms good morals must compensate for the damage."
Luth turned to the Constitutional Court, claiming harm to his constitutional
right to free expression, a right protected in the Basic Law.' The Constitutional
Court adopted Luth's position. It stated that basic human rights constitute an
objective value system, influencing all branches of law, whether private or
public. This objective value system is a standard for assessment of every action,
whether legislative, executive or judicial. Every private law arrangement must
adjust itself to this value system. However, the impact of this objective system
in private law is by the doctrinal means of the private law itself. The dispute
remains, therefore, a private law dispute decided according to private law
provisions, although those provisions operate and are interpreted in accordance
with the Constitution. This is particularly apparent in the private law rules
reflecting public policy. These rules are closely linked to public law, and they
complete it. They are exposed to influence by constitutional law. On this basis
it was held that Luth's behaviour was not behaviour harming good morals and,
accordingly, did not constitute wrongdoing as per paragraph 826 of the Civil
107 See 7 B. Verf. GE (1958). See Kommers, ibid. at 368; Quint, supra note 57 and also
Kommers, "The Jurisprudence of Free Speech in the United States and the Federal
Republic of Germany" (1980) 53 So. Cal. L. Rev. 657.
0 The Basic Law, para. 5, states (in English translation):
"(1) Everyone shall have the right freely to express and disseminate his opinion by
speech, writing, and pictures, and freely to inform himself from generally accessible
sources. Freedom of the press and freedom of reporting by means of broadcasts and
films are guaranteed. There shall be no censorship. (2) These rights are limited by the
provisions of the general laws, the provisions of law for the protection of youth, and
by the right to inviolability of personal honor."
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Code."°9 In reaching this conclusion, the Constitutional Court weighed the
distributor's right to distribute the product against Luth's right of speech.
A later German decision gave additional expression to the indirect
application of the constitutional right to private law. It was determined, for
example, that an unlawful infringement of freedom of expression constitutes
wrongdoing according to paragraph 823 of the Civil Code, by being an act
(intentionally or negligently) which infringes another's right in a manner
violating the law. 0 It was also held that the Constitution defends the right to
privacy, and that infringement of this right - which constitutes wrongdoing
according to paragraph 823 - gives rise to damages under private law. The
Civil Code was interpreted as granting a right to damages only when the damage
is pecuniary, but in light of the constitutional provisions - which protect non--
pecuniary values such as privacy - it also was held that it should be interpreted
in a way that recognizes the right to damages for non-pecuniary harm."1'
By the very same principle, according to which the constitutional principle
radiates into private law by private law doctrines, it was decided that the right
to privacy, derived from constitutional provisions,112 is recognized by the Civil
'0 The Court needed this argument because, per Paragraph 5(2) of the Basic Law, Luth's
right to expression was limited by the provisions of the general laws, including the laws
concerning a distributor's right to distribute his product. The Court determined that the
general laws which may potentially limit freedom of expression - including the Civil
Law Book - must be interpreted on the basis of the constitutional principle of freedom
of expression. The relationship between the basic law and the general law should not
be interpreted as a one-way relationship, according to which the general law can
restrict the basic law. The mutual influence between the two provisions must be
appreciated. The general law does indeed set limits for the freedom of expression, but
this same general law must be interpreted in light of the importance of the value in a
democratic society set forth in the basic right. Therefore, each limiting effect of a basic
right must itself be limited.
110 In the Blinkfuer case; see 25 B. Verf. GE 256.
.. See the Syrian Princess case: A newspaper published an interview - which was
completely fabricated - with the Princess of Syria (the ex-wife of the Persian Shah)
including intimate details about her private life. Syria sued the newspaper for damages
in civil court for the non-pecuniary harm caused to it. It was held that it was entitled
to damages; the Constitutional Court affirmed this holding: see 34 B Verf. GE (1973)
269.
11 Basic Law, paras. I and 2.
Vol. III, No.2
Review of Constitutional Studies
HeinOnline  -- 3 Rev. Const. Stud. 251 1996
Constitutional Human Rights and Private Law 252
Code which protects people in the face of unlawful intentional or negligent
harm." ' Thus it was decided that where the validity of discharging a worker is
limited by the existence of "good cause" or "proper basis," this condition does
not exist if the discharge was based on the fact that the worker exercised his
constitutional right to free expression. I4 In a different case, a contract was made
between a cab driver and his employer, according to which the employee would
not drive for another employer for three months from the termination of the
employment contract, and if he breached this provision he would have to pay a
one-hundred Deutschemark fine. It was held that this provision was void."5 The
Labor Court held that the validity of the provision was determined according to
the principle of public policy. In this framework it is necessary to weigh all the
relevant facts, and among them it is necessary to give - as a result of the Basic
Law - a heavier weight than would be given in the past to freedom of
personhood and freedom of occupation. The provision does not advance any
interest of the employer worth protecting and, accordingly, was void. In
developing this model in German law, the courts did not hesitate to create new
private law tools - as the non-pecuniary damage example demonstrates - so
as to absorb the basic constitutional rights. Nevertheless, it should be noted that,
generally, use is made of existing tools.
2. Italy
The indirect application model has been accepted in Italy."6 It has been held
that, in light of the statutory provisions regarding the protection of health," 7 the
Civil Code provisions" 8 - that thus far had been interpreted as granting
damages only where pecuniary harm was caused - should be interpreted as
granting damages also for non-pecuniary harm such as pain and suffering. It was
' B.G.B. para. 823.
''4 See I BAG 185.
" See BAG 22.11.65; (1966) VI Juristische Schulung.
116 See Sentenza 14 luglio 1986, 184 (Gazzella uffiale, Ia serie speciale, 23 luglio 1986,
No. 35. For a review of the decision, see Foro Italiano, 1986, 1, 1, 2053 ff.
The court pointed to paragraph 32 of the Italian Constitution, which states in English
translation: "The Republic will protect and supervise health as a fundamental
individual right and also as a public interest, and will guarantee free medical treatment
to the poor".
118 Civil Code, pare. 2043.
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held that there is a connection between the constitutional provisions and the
Civil Code provisions, in that the Civil Code is given a constitutional dimension.
In order to give content to the Civil Code provisions it was found to be necessary
to turn to a legal source on the highest normative level - the Constitution. As
such, the constitutional provisions must be integrated into private law.
3. Spain
The accepted approach in Spain is that human rights indirectly influence
private law.' 19 In one case, an employee was fired after being selected to
represent the other employees against the employer. According to private law he
was entitled to damages for unlawful termination. He turned to the Constitu-
tional Court, and it held that, because the motivation for the termination
infringed a constitutional provision which establishes worker representation, the
appropriate remedy was not simply damages, but also reinstatement to his job.
The civil court was requested, therefore, to create new remedies which would
give expression to constitutional rights. 2 ° If the civil court fails to do so, it is
possible to appeal to the Constitutional Court, where the subject of the appeal is
the claim that a constitutional right was violated.
12'
4. Japan
In Japan, constitutional law applies indirectly to private law. 122 Most
problems have arisen in labor law, primarily regarding violations of the principle
of equality and freedom of expression. The problem reached the Supreme Court
of Japan in the following circumstances: 23 the claimant was hired for work as
a temporary employee. After a three-month trial period his contract was not
renewed. The reason given by the respondent - the worker's employer - was
that, before he was hired and despite the fact that he was asked about it, the
See Sanchis, Estudios Sobre Derechos Fundamentales (1990) at 205.
120 See Stc. 5/1981, de 13 de febrero. See also Domenech, Practicas De Derecho
Constitucional (1988) at 167.
121 See Moreno, El Proceso de Amparo Constitutional (1987).
122 See Horan, supra at 864.
123 In the case of Takano v. Mitsubishi Jushi K.K., 27 Minshu 1536. A summary of the
decision in English appears in (1974) 7 Law in Japan 150.
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claimant refrained from disclosing the fact that he was involved in radical
political activity as a university student. The claimant turned to the Tokyo
District Court seeking reinstatement to his job. The District Court held that he
was entitled to return to his job, and based its opinion on the regular civil law.
The Appellate Court - to which the employer appealed - dismissed the appeal.
The Appellate Court's reasoning differed from that of the District Court. It held
that the employer's questions regarding the worker's activities were contrary to
clauses 14 and 19 of the Japanese Constitution - which recognizes the principle
of equality and freedom of expression - because they require the worker to
reveal his political views. In light of the unlawful nature of the questions, the
employee's failure to reveal should not have been seen as an act justifying the
termination of his employment, and accordingly he must be reinstated. The
employer appealed to the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court accepted the
appeal. It was held that constitutional provisions do not apply directly to private
law. Still, the Court held that indirect application is to be achieved by means of
private law doctrines, such as the principle of public policy or specific labor
laws. In this context it is necessary to consider, on the one hand, the principle of
equality and freedom of expression and, on the other hand, the principle of
freedom of occupation and the right to property. On balance, the employer's
actions should not be seen as unlawful actions.
E. APPLICATION TO THE JUDICIARY MODEL
1. United States
As noted, the fourth model for the relationship between constitutional human
rights and private party relationships states that constitutional human rights are
directed against the state and the state alone. Nevertheless, the judiciary is an
organ of the state and, accordingly, constitutional provisions are directed against
it as well. This model has been adopted in the United States. The Bill of Rights
in the United States Constitution is drafted in language which places prohibitions
or obligations on the State. Except for the 13th Amendment - which concerns
the prohibition of slavery - the rest of the amendments are drafted in language
from which the courts' have deduced that the provisions are directed against the
state and the state alone. But who is the "state" against whom the rights are
directed, and when does "state action" violate a private party's right? Extensive
1996
Revue d'dtudes constitutionnelles
HeinOnline  -- 3 Rev. Const. Stud. 254 1996
scholarship has been developed on this matter.124 At the base of this scholarship
stands the recognition that the judiciary is an arm of the state as well. When the
judiciary acts, the state acts. Human rights are protected and entitled to
protection not only against the legislature and executive, but also against the
judiciary. Hence, two inferences are drawn: The first is that there is some "state
action" in the creation and development of the common law. Accordingly, it was
held in the case of New York Times v. Sullivan125 that common law rules
regarding defamation must adjust themselves to the principle of freedom of
expression established in the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
In addressing the claim that the First Amendment to the constitution is directed
against the state, whereas the dispute before the Court was a civil matter between
private parties, Justice Brennan stated:
126
That proposition has no application to this case. Although this is a civil law suit
between private parties, the Alabama courts have applied a state rule of law which
petitioners claim to impose invalid restrictions on their constitutional freedoms of
speech and press. It matters not that law has been applied in a civil action and that it
is common law only. The test is not the form in which state power has been applied
but, whatever the form, whether such power has in fact been exercised.
The second inference drawn by the Court was that, in granting relief within
the framework of private law, the court is likely to find itself in a situation in
which the relief it grants stands in contradiction to constitutional human rights.
This is the rule of Shelley v. Kraemer.'7 Suppose a contract was made between
Reuven and Shimon, in which Reuven was obligated not to grant property rights
in land to black people. Reuven sold land to Levy, a black person. Shimon
turned to the Court with a claim against Levy, based on the restrictive covenant
in the contract. Shimon asked the Court to issue an order enjoining Levy not to
enter the land. Such a suit was dismissed in the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court
noted that the Fourteenth Amendment to the constitution, which establishes the
right to equality, is directed against the state and not to relationships between
private parties, and that in the contractual relationship between Levy and
Shimon, Levy's constitutional rights were not breached. But here judicial
24 See Tribe, supra note 92 at 1688.
121 See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 1 (1948).
126 Ibid. at 265.
," See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. I (1948).
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enforcement was requested, and the act of judicial enforcement is a "state
action" violating Levy's constitutional right to equality.'28 Chief Justice Vinson
noted:
129
That the action of state courts and judicial officers in their official capacities is to be
regarded as action of the state within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, is a
proposition which has long been established by decisions of this Court [and] ... state
action in violation of the Amendment's provisions is equally repugnant to the
constitutional commands whether directed by state statute or taken by a judicial official
in the absence of statute.
The Court noted that without the active involvement of the Court, behind which
stands the power of the state, Levy would be free to enter the land which he
purchased without any restriction. On account of the Court's involvement, Levy
is prevented - because of his being black - from the enjoyment of a right he
would have received as a willing buyer from a willing seller. 3 '
The scope of the Shelley rule is not at all clear. Fierce criticism has been
levelled against it.' 3 ' If we take the case to its extreme, then every constitutional
right directed against the state becomes, by virtue of the court's action, a right
directed against private parties. American courts refrained from drawing a
conclusion of this sort; extensive case law narrowed the scope of application of
28 See Shelley, ibid. at 13 per Vinson, C.J.: "That Amendment erects no shield against
merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful ... the restrictive
agreements standing alone cannot be regarded as violative of any rights guaranteed to
petitioners by the Fourteenth Amendment. So long as the purposes of those agreements
are effectuated by voluntary adherence to their terms, it would appear clear that there
has been no action by the state and the provisions of the Amendment have not been
violated."
129 Chief Justice Vinson wrote in Shelley, ibid at 13: "These are cases in which the
purposes of the agreements were secured only by judicial enforcement by state courts
of the restrictive terms of the agreements". If Levy entered the property, and Shimon
sued Reuven for breach of contract, his lawsuit would be dismissed because of the
Shelley rule: see Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
30 Shelley, ibid.
131 See Louis Henkin, "Shelley v. Kraemer Notes for a Revised Opinion" (1962) 110 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 473; Herbert Wechsler, "Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law"
(1959) 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1; Harold W. Horowitz, "The Misleading Search for 'State
Action' Under the Fourteenth Amendment" (1957) 30 So. Cal. L. Rev. 208.
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the Shelley rule. Thus, for example, it was held that a court will grant the remedy
of eviction against trespasser defendants, who entered the claimant's land over
his objection, which was based on the fact that the defendants were black.132
Also, a will which discriminated against blacks was upheld by the Court.'33
IV. CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE PROPER SOLUTION
A. THE PROPER SOLUTION: NEGATION OF THE NON-
APPLICATION MODEL
The approach, which appears to me to be proper, views basic human rights
as a union of ideas. Uniting human rights which grant liberty to the private party
and those which negate the rights of his fellow-man,134 whether in rem rights
protected against the "entire world," or whether rights directed against both the
government and other private parties. There is no human rights "double-system"
and "double-entry accounting" should not be established regarding them. There
is one system of human rights, which in the past has been based on "regular"
legislation and on the Israeli-style common law. Today these rights are on a
higher normative level. By being anchored in Basic Laws they have constitu-
tional super-legislative status.
Hence, I do not think that human rights protected in the Basic Laws apply
only in public law. They have comprehensive application to both public and
private law areas, and they are essentially the new basis for both public and
private law. Indeed, if in the past basic human rights were derived from
administrative and private law, now administrative and private law must be
derived from constitutional human rights. This is the meaning of the constitu-
tional revolution in the human rights area. From this perspective my approach
132 G. Gunther, Constitutional Law, 12th ed., (Mineola, N.Y.: Foundation Press, 1991) at
904.
"3 See Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970).
134 For the Hohfeldian study of human rights, see W.N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal
Conceptions (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1934); see also Crim. App. 95/51
Pudmasky v. Attorney General, P.D. 6 341.
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clearly rejects the non-application model as the proper model. I addressed this
point in the Kestenbaum case, when I noted:135
It is understood and clear that the basic principles of the system in general and basic
human rights in particular are not limited solely to public law. The distinction between
public law and private law is not that strong. The legal system is not a confederation
of legal areas. It is a union of system and law. Indeed, the basic principles are the
principles of the entire system, and not just of public law. Basic human rights are not
directed solely against the government. They also extend to mutual relationships
among private parties. Would anyone ever think that it is possible in Israel for two
private parties to enter into a contract according to which one will become the other's
slave? Indeed, the true question is not whether the basic principles of public law apply
to private law. The answer to this question is simple and clear - yes. The true
questions are, how do the basic principles of public law flow into private law, and what
are the channels by which these principles are transferred to private party behaviour in
relations with other private parties.
The danger to human rights does indeed primarily emanate from the govern-
ment, but it is not the only danger. Danger to human rights also lies in wait from
the conduct of other private parties. Alongside the need to restrict the power of
the state as to private parties, there is also a need to limit the power of private
parties in their mutual relations. The non-application model is not appropriate
because it draws too stark a line between public and private law. Indeed, basic
human rights are not directed solely against the government. They apply also to
mutual relationships among private parties. 1
3 6
B. DIRECT OR INDIRECT APPLICATION
1. Strengthened and Augmented Indirect Application
It seems to me, therefore, that basic human rights also apply in private law.
Is their application direct or indirect? In my opinion the proper model is the
indirect application model. However, this is not the regular indirect application
model, but a strengthened and augmented indirect application model. The reason
for my approach stems from the substance of human rights on the one hand, and
of private law on the other. Human rights restrict each other; Reuven's right is
'3 Civ. App. 294/91, supra, note 5 at 530.
136 Civ. App. 294/91, ibid. at 530.
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Shimon's "non-right." This "non-right" detracts from Shimon's human rights.
Therefore, recognition of the human rights of one person against another
necessarily requires limitation and narrowing, as a consequence of having regard
for the other's rights. This limitation and narrowing must be evaluated within a
particular normative framework. This framework concerns relationships between
private parties. This is private law. Hence, recognition of human rights requires
restrictions and limitations set forth in private law itself. Indirect application,
therefore, is required.
This conclusion is decreed from the very essence of private law, which is
nothing but the legal regime which regulates the cooperative existence of various
human rights while considering the public interest. Indeed, at the base of private
law stand the basic human rights directed against other private parties. Private
law is, in a certain sense, the legal framework which determines the legal
relationship between basic human rights and the proper balance between
conflicting human rights, while considering the public interest. Private law is the
expression of restrictions placed on human rights to realize human rights while
safeguarding the public interest. Private law is the framework which translates
constitutional human rights into a "give and take" way of life between private
parties. Indeed, private law includes a complicated and expansive system of
balances and arrangements which are intended to make collective life of various
private parties possible, in which each individual enjoys basic human rights. The
recognition-of human rights against private parties must, therefore, "permeate"
via private law "channels." This is the true meaning of indirect application.
2. The Essence of Strengthened Indirect Application
As mentioned, I believe that constitutional human rights apply (indirectly)
in private law. This outlook is based on two assumptions. First, that constitu-
tional human rights set forth in the Basic Laws are directed not only against the
government but also against other private parties. The freedom of property is the
freedom of a private party against both the government and against other private
parties. Second, that remedies for breaching human rights in interpersonal
relationships must find a place in private law. According to this concept, private
law is the "geometric place" to formulate remedies for an infringement that one
private party imposes on the constitutional right of another private party.
According to this approach, when a constitutional right of one private party is
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breached by another private party, the injured private party must find his relief
within private law. To the extent that existing private law grants an appropriate
remedy - i.e., a remedy consistent with the scope of the right and proper
protection as demanded by the Basic Law - it fulfils its role, and does not give
rise to any practical difficulty. To the extent that existing private law does not
grant an appropriate remedy - i.e., despite breach of the constitutional right, no
remedy is granted in private law - the strengthened indirect application model
states that private law must change itself, such that it will find a remedy as
needed. Thus, the uniqueness of the strengthened indirect application model is
that it places a demand upon private law. It obligates it to prepare appropriate
tools "for the absorption" of constitutional human rights. To the extent that these
tools do not exist, it is upon private law to create tools such as these. These can
be created by means of new interpretations of existing tools (such as giving a
new interpretation to the principle of good faith) or by the creation of new tools,
whether by filling lacunae, or by the general principle that where there is a right,
there is a remedy.
3. The Strengthened Indirect Application Model and the Direct
Application Model
In what way, then, does the strengthened indirect application model differ
from the direct application model? The two models call for application of
constitutional human rights in private law. Accordingly, breach of a constitu-
tional human right is likely, according to both of them, to constitute a breach of
a constitutional obligation. The difference between them is this: The direct
application model ignores private law. It decrees relief directly from the
constitutional right, by way of rules of relief which are outside the private law.
It creates a type of "constitutional private law" which exists alongside regular
private law. In contrast, the strengthened indirect application model sees within
existing private law the appropriate normative system for giving relief for
infringement of a constitutional right. According to this model, it is not
necessary to ignore private law, and it is not necessary to create constitutional
private law alongside regular private law. According to the strengthened indirect
application model, the regular private law is constitutional private law, because
private law is nothing but an expression of the constitutional human rights of




HeinOnline  -- 3 Rev. Const. Stud. 260 1996
Justice Aharon Barak
4. Indirect Application Model and Strengthened Indirect Application
Model
What is the difference between the classic indirect application model and the
strengthened indirect application model? There is no difference between the two
at all in situations where private law has developed appropriate tools to give
expression to constitutional human rights. Therefore, when a contract is made,
the general rules of public policy and good faith fill their appropriate role, and
permit (indirect) application of constitutional human rights in private law. The
substantive difference between the two models stands out in those cases where
private law does not contain legal tools or institutions for the absorption of
constitutional human rights. According to the classic indirect application model,
there is no alternative in this case but to deny the injured private party a remedy.
In contrast, the strengthened indirect application model states that in this
situation it is upon the private law to change itself, and create the missing tools
or institutions. Private law cannot remain indifferent to an infringement of a
constitutional human right. The obligation is placed upon it to "absorb" this
breach and grant a remedy for it. Between public law (the creator of the right)
and private law (the grantor of the remedy for the right) there must be
"integrated tools." Where the right is recognized (in public law), the remedy
must also be recognized (in private law).
5. The Strengthened Indirect Application Model and the Creation of
New Legal Tools
The strengthened indirect application model is based on the concept that
private law must create tools to give relief for infringement of a constitutional
human right. Where these tools do not exist, it is incumbent upon the legislature
to create them. What can be done if the legislature refrains from action? It seems
to me that it is possible to point to several lines of thought: first, at times a
constitutional duty (status positivus) is placed upon the legislature to fix
remedies for infringements of constitutional human rights, such as damage to
human dignity; second, the absence of a legal arrangement is likely at times to
be considered a lacunae, allowing it to be filled according to the applicable
rules; third, sometimes it is possible to create new tools by renovating old tools,
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for example, new understandings of concepts such as good faith, 13 7 negligence,
and public policy. Fourth, the general private law principle, according to which
where there is a right, there is a remedy (ubi ius, ibi remedium), is likely to be
a source for the creation of new tools which will be part of private law.
6. Indirect Application Model And Breach of Statutory Duty
An expression of the uniqueness of the strengthened indirect application
model and the differences between it and the regular indirect application model
can be seen in the positions of the two models towards the tort of breach of
statutory duty. According to the strengthened indirect application model, the
violation of a constitutional human right is likely to constitute the tort of breach
of statutory duty, which grants a remedy to one private party against another.
The regular indirect application model does not necessarily reach this result. In
this regard there is great similarity, as we have seen, between the strengthened
indirect application model and the direct application model. According to both
of them, the violation of a constitutional human right is likely to be a breach of
a statutory duty.
7. Strengthened Indirect Application Model and the Level of Protection
Afforded to Human Rights
Examination of human rights requires a distinction between the scope of the
right and the level of protection afforded to it. The scope of the right means the
variety of actions captured within its framework. Examination of the scope of the
right to expression requires an answer to the question of whether the right to
expression extends to actions (and not just speech), such as the display of a
wooden dummy,138 to the right to be silent, and to racist expression.'39 The level
of protection afforded to the right examines the full range of the right and
determines which areas within the entire range will be protected and which areas
will not be protected. Failure to protect is likely to arise from public interest
alone (for the sake of protecting state secrets, speech exposing state secrets is not
protected), or from the private interest alone (for the sake of protecting personal
See text associated with notes 179-185, infra.
'3 See H.C. 953/89 Indor v. Mayor of Jerusalem, P.D. 45 (4) 83.




HeinOnline  -- 3 Rev. Const. Stud. 262 1996
263 Justice Aharon Barak
privacy, speech exposing private details is not protected), or from a combined
public-private interest (protection of one's good name and privacy is both a
public and private interest, and it negates protection of speech or action which
is defamatory or infringes on privacy). Indeed, human rights are not protected
by law to the fullest extent possible. Protection of Reuven's human rights to the
fullest extent possible necessarily infringes Shimon's claim for similar
recognition of his human rights. Hence, the concept that human rights are not
absolute but relative.
The level of protection is determined through consideration of values,
interests and principles worthy of protection. Some express a public interest
(integrity of the State, its democratic nature, public order). The bulk of them
combine public and private interests. Private law determines the level of
protection afforded to human rights relative to other human rights. Contract,
property, and tort law determine the extent to which a person is entitled to work
to realize his human rights without his actions violating another's human rights.
In determining the level of protection afforded to human rights, private law
considers the other's human rights and public interest. Thus, for example,
freedom to fashion a contract is recognized, but this freedom is limited by
"public policy," which reflects the public interest and the protected human rights
of others.'40 Private law recognizes freedom of action, but limits it within the
framework of various wrongs in the Torts Ordinance.'
4'
In formulating the rules setting forth the limitations on the extent of human
rights in private law, private law - which is largely statutory - must fulfil the
limitation clause142 set forth in the Basic Laws.'43  Thus, for example, to the
extent that a new property law "infringes" on a person's property - i.e., it does
not protect the full range of a person's property - it is necessary that it fulfil the
requirements of the limitations clause. In determining the proper purpose, and
in determining the "demand," it is necessary to consider, of course, inter alia, the
human rights of others. Legislation which has passed the limitations clause tests
140 See text associated with note 75, infra.
"41 See Torts (Civil Wrong) Ordinance (New Version).
142 Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, para.5.
'4 The old legislation was entrenched: See Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, para.
10.
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weighs in an appropriate manner the human rights set forth in the Basic Laws.
At times this balance is formulated by means of value terms, such as "good
faith,'"4 "negligence,"'' 45 "reasonableness, "146 "public policy."'' 47  These terms
reflect the basic values and concepts of the Israeli legal system. They are the
expression of constitutional values. They are the expression of protected human
rights themselves.
Accordingly, value phrases are one of the important channels through which
constitutional basic rights and other legal values flow into private law: "Private
law includes among its obligations a number of doctrines which serve as tools
through which the basic principles of the system in general, and human rights in
particular, flow into private laws.' 47  Justice Dov Levin addressed this when
he stated:
1 49
The provisions of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, directed against the government
authorities, extend in practice also to mutual relationships between private parties.
Private law includes among its obligations a number of doctrines, such as the principles
of good faith and public policy, which serve as channels through which basic principles
of the legal system in general, and human rights in particular, flow from public law into
private law. [Thus] ... when the contents of a contract harm the freedom of occupation,
balancing is required between the conflicting principles. When the contractual
arrangement is based on an infringement which is greater than that arising from the
proper societal balance between freedom of occupation and freedom of contract, it
must be voided for being against public policy. Public policy is a value rule which
permits flexibility in the workings of private law, and it is most sensitive to constitu-
tional considerations. It permits expression of human rights and public interest as per
their state at various times, without any need for a formal change in the private law
balances. By means of the public policy principle, the court weighs the aforesaid
freedom to fashion the content of a contract against other human rights to constitutional
values, such as freedom of occupation.
'4 See, for example, Contracts Law (General Part) 4733-1973, paras. 12, 39; Sales Law
5728-1968, para. 6.
141 See Torts (Civil Wrong) Ordinance (New Version), paras 35, 36.
146 See Contracts -Law (General Part), 5733-1973 paras. 21, 41, 56; Contracts Law
(Remedies for Breach of Contract) 5731-1971, paras. 6, 7, 8, 9, 14.
141 See Contracts Law (General Part), 5733-1973, para. 30.
141 Civ. App. 294/91, supra, note 5.
141 Civ. App. 239/92, Egged v. Mashiach, P.D. 48 (2) 66. See also President Goldberg's
statement in Lab. Ct. Hrg. 53/3-177-8-9 Sharam Inc. Spokesperson v. Globus Inc.,
P.D.E. 395, quoted infra, note 160.
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To be more precise: all of private law reflects balancing between conflicting
values. Within the framework of private law it has been deemed appropriate to
establish value rules, which permit flexibility in the workings of private law.
These value provisions are particularly sensitive to constitutional considerations.
They permit expression of human rights and public interests according to their
state at various times, without any need to make a formal change in the private
law balances. Thus, for example, the principle of "public policy" is a flexible
principle, by means of which the court balances the constitutional freedom to
fashion the content of a contract against human rights and different constitutional
values. 5 ' Similarly, the "good faith" principle is an objective principle which
fixes a minimum level of appropriate conduct between private parties, which
reflects that which is deemed appropriate in our society. This principle reflects
a proper balance between conflicting human rights."5 ' The same applies as to the
wrong of negligence, which reflects what the person in Israel "must" foresee,
and expresses the basic principles of Israeli law,' including the proper balance
between human rights set forth in the Basic Laws.
8. Private Law as a Balancing System
Accordingly, private law reflects two systems of balancing. The first system
determines the very content of private law itself, including the value provisos in
it. Balancing is conducted according to the limitations clause set forth in the
Basic Laws. This clause is addressed to the legislature, and sets forth how to
determine the appropriate content of legislation. The second system of balancing
is made within the framework of private law itself, after the balancing required
in the limitations clause has taken place. This is a balancing demanded by the
value terms themselves, which is designed to give them concrete content. This
balancing is conducted by the judge, and occasionally constitutes an expression
50 See Civ. App. 294/91, supra note 5.
'5' See H.C. 59/80 Be'er Sheva Public Transportation Services v. National Labor Court,
P.D. 35 (1) 828; Civ. App. 391/80 Lasserson v. Workers Housing Inc., P.D. 38 (2) 237;
Civ. App. 207/79, supra, note 10; Add. Hmg. 7/81 Pnidar v. Castro, P.D. 37 (4) 673.
152 See Civ. App. 451/64 Kornfeld v. Shmuelov, P.D. 21 (1) 310, 324; Civ. App. 243/83,
supra note 20 at 130; Civ. App. 343/74 Grovner v. City ofHaifa, P.D. 33 (1) 141; Civ.
App. 518/82 Zidov v. Katz, P.D. 40 (2) 85.
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of judicial discretion. It also considers basic values and human rights set forth
in the Basic Laws. It is the fruit of the judicial "limitation clause," which acts
within the framework of private law itself.
This is the concretization of the constitutional "limitation clause" in the
context of the value concepts. This is one of the important expressions of the
idea of indirect application of human rights set forth in Basic Laws to private
law. To be more precise: "value terms" are not the only means by which
protected human rights infiltrate into private law. Thus, for example, every
private law statute - like every public law statute - must be interpreted against
the background of basic human rights. The assumption is that the object of every
statute - including statutes concerning private law - is to realize basic human
rights. Moreover, Basic Laws fall within the definition of "statutes" designed to
benefit private parties and, accordingly, an infringement of a constitutional
human right carries with it responsibility in tort for the wrong of violating a
statutory duty.'53 Finally, indirect application is likely to require the creation of
new private law tools for the purpose of "absorbing" constitutional human
rights.'54 One of the important methods which makes use of existing tools in
private law, is that which recognizes the (indirect) application of protected
human rights in private law by means of the "value terms."
9. Adjustment of Private Law To The Application Of Basic Laws
Basic human rights apply in private law. The balancing between them, and
between them and the public interest, is the framework of private law. To the
extent that private law is legislated - and this is essentially the rule in Israel -
this framework reflects the status of basic rights on the eve of enactment of the
statute. Then a change in human rights occurs, they become constitutional rights
with normative super-legislative force. What impact does this change have on
private law? The answer is that the impact is upon various areas. First, regarding
the content of private law itself, new legislation must adjust itself to basic human
rights in general and to the limitations clause in the basic laws in particular. Thus
'5' Torts (Civil Wrong) Ordinance (New Version), para. 63. The duty derived from basic
rights is the fruit of balancing various human rights against each other, and of
balancing them against the public interest.
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Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty realigned an old statute because of this
need. "'55 Second, the value terms must be imbued with concrete content by the
basic rights and values at the time of their interpretation. Indeed, this is the role
and power of value terms. They absorb social values, constitutional human rights
and public interests according to their state at the time of their interpretation, and
not according to their state at the time of legislation. Therefore, current "public
policy" is considered in the new constitutional system, including the super-
legislative nature of human rights.
To the extent that courts have formulated the content of value terms
according to the non-constitutional nature of basic rights, it is now necessary to
change the common law rule, and replace it with a new rule which reflects the
new constitutional balance. Thus, for example, the good faith principle must
reflect the proper balance between constitutional rights according to their state
after the enactment of the Basic Laws, and on the basis of basic principles as per
their state at the time of interpretation. Also, a contract to restrict freedom of
occupation is contrary to public policy if the restriction in it is not "reasonable."
The reasonableness of the restriction balances the rights of the parties and the
public interest. Within the framework of this balance, the parties' rights have
been strengthened. The right to fashion the content of a contract - directly
derived from the constitutional right to the autonomy of the individual will, and
in the absence of this type of explicit constitutional right, from the principle of
human dignity and liberty - received constitutional status, and the right to
freedom of occupation received constitutional status. Simultaneously, the power
of public interest was decreased. These new relations require renewed examina-
tion regarding the proper balance between conflicting values. What was
conceived of as "reasonable" in the past will likely not be conceived of as
"reasonable" today.
Third, in the existing private law framework a need for the creation of new
norms is likely to arise, which will give expression to the new constitutional
structure and new human rights. The existing private law tools will probably not
suffice for "the absorption" of the new rights. This task is placed, first and
foremost, on the legislature. If the legislature is not up to the task, it is then
'" Regarding this, see Article 10 of the Basic Law.
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placed upon the judge. The judiciary may do so first and foremost by filling gaps
in existing legislation. Indeed, we have a "late lacuna"'156 before us, which was
created as a result of the enactment of the new Basic Laws. It is also possible for
the judge to create new tools by developing private law.'57 This development is
likely to primarily be required in the area of remedies for infringement of
constitutional human rights, to the extent that existing private law does not
contain adequate remedies.
C. THE AUTONOMY OF INDIVIDUAL WILL AND BALANCING
BETWEEN CONFLICTING PROTECTED HUMAN RIGHTS
1. The Autonomy of Individual Will as a Constitutional Right
The primary argument against the application of protected human rights in
private law is that recognition of protected human rights in relations between
private parties will deeply damage human rights themselves, primarily the
autonomy of individual will.' If a parent will be required to maintain a
relationship of equality when distributing an inheritance among the children, and
if a prospective party to a contract will be obligated to maintain equality in the
selection of contract partners, the principle of freedom of connection will be
harmed. If a person is prohibited from making a contract infringing freedom of
occupation or freedom of property or freedom of speech and movement, freedom
of contract will be seriously infringed. My answer to this claim is that among the
totality of basic rights which must be considered are the basic rights of human
dignity and personal development, and these contain the autonomy of the
individual will. From these the principle of freedom of connection and the
principle of freedom of contract are derived. 5 9
156 Late lacuna, means a lacuna (or gap) created not at the time of enactment of legislation
but at some later time, due to other legislative developments. On the general theory of
gaps, see C.W. Canaris, Die Festellung von Lucken in Gesetz (1964).
'" For the development of the law, and for the distinction between it and filling lacunae,
see A. Barak, "Judicial Creativity - Interpretation, the Filling of Gaps, and the
Development of the Law" HaPraklit 29 (5750) 267; see, for example, Fur. Hrg. 29/84
Cassoy v. Feuchtwanger Bank, P.D. 38 (4) 505, 511.
's See text following note 48, supra.
159 For these principles and the distinctions between them, see Shalev, The Law of
Contract 23-35 (Jerusalem, 5750).
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The principle of freedom of connection and the principle of freedom of
contract, therefore, are themselves constitutional principles, and they themselves
are protected constitutional human rights.160 When Reuven makes a contract with
Shimon, according to which Shimon will abstain from his exercise of freedom
of expression or movement, it cannot be said instantly that the contract is
contrary to public policy because it violates Shimon's freedom of expression or
freedom of movement. In answering the question of whether the contract is
contrary to public policy, one must consider together Reuven and Shimon's
freedom of contract, in addition to other liberties. The contract will be contrary
to public policy only if, in the comprehensive balancing of the conflicting
values, Shimon's freedom of expression and movement is more "prominent."
Similarly, in contradistinction to Reuven's constitutional right not to be
discriminated against by the contractual connection which Shimon seeks to enter
into, stands Shimon's constitutional right to connect with whomever he chooses.
2. Balance Between the Autonomy of the Individual Will and Other
Liberties
How are the protected human rights balanced against each other? Our basic
laws include a limitation clause, 6' which sets forth a balancing formula which
limits the legislature. Does this formula apply in and of itself also in relations
among private parties? My answer to this question, in the Kestenbaum case, was
negative: 1
6 2
In the transference of basic principles of the legal system in general, and basic human
rights in particular, from public law to private law, a change takes place. The
government's duty to observe human rights is not identical in content to the private
party's obligation to observe human rights.
'6 See Civ. App. 239/92, supra note 149: "Contractual connection contains expression of
the autonomy of the individual will, and therefore is anchored today in the principles
of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty" (Justice D. Levine). See also Lab. Ct. Hrg.
53/3-177-8-9 Sharam Inc. Spokesperson v. Globus Inc., P.D.E. 395 at 410: "Let us not
forget, freedom of contract is a constitutional right" (Justice Goldberg).
161 See Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, para.5.
162 Civ. App. 294/91, supra note 5 at 531.
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Indeed, the proper balance between human rights and the "pure" public interest
in public peace, security and prosperity, is not like the proper balance among
human rights themselves. It seems, therefore, that alongside the balancing
formula set forth in the limitation clause, it is necessary to establish another
formula for balancing the various human rights in their conflicts with each other.
On the basis of this need for the creation of a judicial balancing formula for
conflicts between protected human rights, an additional argument arises against
the application of protected human rights in private law. This argument is that,
as the application of protected human rights in private law requires the creation
of a judicial balancing formula, and without being intended by the basic laws
themselves, the matter is subject to judicial discretion. This is an enormous
power, which it is not proper to give to the judiciary.
This argument is unsatisfactory. The need for judicial balancing formulae in
conflicts between human rights is an ancient need. Courts have done this since
time immemorial. Take the restraint of trade rules as an example. These are
nothing but rules which balance between the constitutional right to freedom of
contract and the constitutional right to freedom of occupation or trade. Just as the
courts fulfilled this task in the past, they can fulfil it in the future, and just as the
courts did not wrongfully exploit their power in the past, there is no reason to
assume that they will fail in their task and wrongfully exploit this power in the
future. Those who fear wrongful exploitation of judicial power must therefore
be wary of constitutionalized legislation in general. By its very nature, the
constitution - which is accompanied by judicial review - is based on
recognition of broad judicial discretion.
As an example, take the limitation clause set forth in the Basic Laws. It does
not provide a great deal ofjudicial guidance. The "majestic generalities" 163 in the
Basic Laws do not fill themselves with normative content. They require judicial
consideration. Just as it is assumed and hoped - on the basis of past experience
- that the judge will give expression to the basic conceptions of society and not
his own personal views in giving content to the "limitation clauses," it is
assumed and hoped that the judicial balancing formulae in conflicts between
protected human rights will reflect the "views accepted by the enlightened




HeinOnline  -- 3 Rev. Const. Stud. 270 1996
271 Justice Aharon Barak
public,"'" and not the judge's private views. Indeed, the skilled judge is expert
in this activity, and there is no reason to assume that he will fail in this task.165
3. Freedom to Fashion Contractual Content and Protected Human
Rights
The application of protected human rights in private law need not cause, in
principle, conceptual difficulty where a contract is made and the question is the
extent of its validity.'66 This question was addressed routinely in the past, and
great experience has been amassed in this area. Courts have dealt expansively
with the question of the relationship between freedom of contract (in the sense
of freedom to fashion a contract) and the right to freedom of occupation or
trade. 67 The same applies in other situations in which a contract is made which
is claimed to be contrary to a human right. Thus, for example, courts have dealt
with the relation between the freedom to fashion a contract and the freedom of
expression, when a contract was made which contained a provision according to
which a newspaper took upon itself an obligation not to publish certain items.'68
Likewise there is case law regarding the relationship between freedom to fashion
a contract and the right to personhood and human dignity.'69 The courts have
dedicated much attention to the relationship between freedom to fashion a
contract and the principle of equality, where a contract has created discrimina-
tion. 170
On the "enlightened public," see A. Barak, "The Enlightened Public" in Landau Book,
Vol. 2 (Tel Aviv: Bursi, 1995).
165 See F. Frankfurter, Of Law and Life and Other Things That Matter: Papers and
Addresses of Felix Frankfurter, ed. by P.B. Kurland (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1965) at 188.
166 See Cohen, "'Equality' versus Freedom of Contract" 1 Ha Mishpat A 131 (1993).
167 Within the doctrine of restraint of trade, see Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston, Law of
Contracts, 12th ed. (London: Butterworths, 1991) at 397.
68 See Neville v. Dominion of Canada News Co. [1915] 3 K.B. 556.
169 See Horwood v. Millar's Timber and Trading Co. [1917] K.B. 305.
170 See 33/3-25 Daily Air Staff Committee v. Chazin, P.D.E. 4 365; H.C. 410/76 Herut v.
National Labor Court in Jerusalem, P.D. 31 (3) 124; H.C. 104/87 Nevo v. National
Labour Court, P.D. 44 (4) 749: Paragraph 6 [to the Collective Arrangement] creates
a discriminatory arrangement, which harms the women's rights to participate equally
in work affairs. Accordingly in my opinion, this paragraph is contrary to public policy,
and by law, accordingly, this Court should involve itself and void its content" (Justice
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In all these cases a contract existed (an expression of the freedom of
connection and the freedom to fashion), and the question is whether by its
content it violates a human right (such as freedom of expression, freedom of
occupation, and human dignity). The private law principle regarding "public
policy" examines these questions, while reflecting in its very substance the
totality of society's basic conceptions, including the weight and status of human
rights. In the past it was done regarding human rights "which were not inscribed
in a book."'71 Now it is done regarding "rights inscribed in a book" entitled to
constitutional protection. To be precise: just as the right to freedom of property
and freedom of occupation were elevated in normative level - from a "common
law" right to a "constitutional" right - so too the right to freedom to fashion a
contract was elevated a level. This right is an expression of human dignity and
liberty, and it too has constitutional status.
Just as courts dealt in the past with the appropriate balance between freedom
to fashion a contract and the other unprotected human rights, so too they will
deal in the future with the appropriate balance between freedom to fashion a
contract and the other protected human rights. Of course, the content of the
balance is likely to change. Indeed, the proper balance reflects the status and
weight of the human right relative to other human rights.'72 Perhaps in the past
human rights (such as freedom of occupation) had lower status than today. If
indeed a change takes place in the status of the right, the matter will find
expression in the balance between it and other rights in the framework of the
principle of "public policy." To be precise: the balance between freedom to
fashion a contract and the other human rights will be made according to
"balancing formulae" which differ from those according to which these human
rights will be balanced in their conflicts with the public interest. Indeed, it is
necessary to distinguish between the conflict of values in public law (public
order against human rights), and conflicts of values in private law (the right of
Bach).
' As per Justice Landau's words in H.C. 243/62, supra, note 17 at 2415.
172 See Lab. Ct. Hrg. 53/3-177-8-9, supra, note 163: "Where an agreement restricts an
employee's freedom of occupation, and a period of time is fixed for the restriction, the
court will assess the reasonableness of the restriction and weigh it as necessary,
considering the basic laws and rights: Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, Basic Law:
Human Dignity and Liberty (particularly para. 3) and the constitutional basic right of
freedom of contractual connection" (President Goldberg).
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one person against the right of another person). The difference in conflicting
values brings with it a difference in balancing formulae, but this difference
should not be exaggerated. The public interest is that which will preserve the
proper balance of human rights in private law. The Contract Law, enacted by the
legislature, is an expression of public law activity, which is subject to the
limitation clause in the Basic Laws. Nonetheless, the subject of the law is
primarily private law relations, which must reflect an appropriate balance
between these values.
Indeed, the difference between public law, which also includes, inter alia,
consideration of private interests, and private law, which protects public interests
by means of "public policy," is too blurred. There is no need to be sorry about
this. We are dealing with, essentially, "integrated tools." The public interest is
not a value in itself. It is intended to protect human rights. Human rights are not
"absolute," and they are subject both to each other and to the public interest
itself. Without order and regime, human rights do not exist. The principle of
''public policy," considered both in human rights in their internal conflicts and
in the general public interest, gives expression to this composite.
4. Freedom to Make a Contract and the Principle of Equality
Freedom of contract has two aspects: the freedom to enter into a contract and
the freedom to shape the content of a contract. Regarding the second aspect,
there is substantial legal experience in fixing the balance between the freedom
to fashion the content of a contract and other human rights. The law of restraint
of trade deals with those problems. There is no legal experience, however, in
fixing the balance between freedom to make a contract and other human
rights.'73 The principle problem arises where freedom to make or not to make a
contract conflicts with the equality principle.'74 Is a restaurant owner entitled to
refuse to give service on the basis of gender, race or religion? Can a private
party, seeking to rent out a room in his apartment, refuse to rent it out on the
basis of gender, race or religion? On a practical level, the problem does not arise
where there is legislation dealing with the topic ("civil rights legislation"). But
'73 On the freedom to enter into a contract, and on the difference between it and the
freedom to fashion a contract, see Shalev, supra, note 162 at 25.
The analysis is based on the assumption that equality is a constitutional human right.
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what is the rule in the absence of specific legislation dealing with the matter? My
intuition says that the restaurant owner has an obligation to give service - that
is, to make a contract - without discriminating on the basis of gender, race or
religion.
In contrast, the same intuition states that the private party, renting out a room
in his apartment, is entitled to choose the renter as he sees fit. This intuition is
based, primarily, on the proper balance between the freedom to make a contract
of the restaurant or apartment owner and the right of the person seeking the
service (food or dwelling) not to be discriminated against. In other words, I
accept that the restaurant or apartment owner has constitutional freedom to
decide with whom to contract. Similarly, I accept that the person wishing to eat
in the restaurant or rent the room enjoys the right not to be discriminated against
(whether by the state or by other private parties), and that if he is refused on the
basis of gender, religion or race, it is discrimination.
In balancing between these rights when they conflict, the right of the person
not to be discriminated against dominates in the restaurant example, and the
freedom to enter or not to enter into a contract dominates in the incident of the
owner of the room for rent. The rationale at the base of this balance is grounded
on the concept that freedom to make a contract is much stronger when it is
related to a person's privacy, and it becomes weaker when it is directed against
the public-at-large. Similarly, the right not to be discriminated against is
strongest when service is given to the general public and a person is segregated
from it on the basis of race, gender or religion. The right not to be discriminated
against grows weaker where the service, by its very nature, is not "open" to all,
and it is given on a personal basis. When a restaurant owner refuses to give
service to a customer because of his race, religion or gender, the restaurant
owner's right to freedom to enter into a contract is a weaker force, whereas the
right of the service recipient not to be discriminated against is at its strongest
force. In these circumstances, the service recipient must get the advantage. In
contrast, when an apartment owner refuses to rent a room in his apartment on the
basis of race, gender or religion, his right to freedom of contract is at its greatest
force, whereas the right of the potential renter not to be discriminated against is
at its weakest force. In these circumstances, the landlord gets the advantage.
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5. Balance Between Autonomy of the Individual Will and Equality:
The Good Faith Principle
Let us now assume that my approach is the proper one. According to it, he
who gives service to the public must not discriminate between service recipients
on the basis of gender, race or religion. Does the private law include tools which
permit this result? The "public policy" principle is not useful, because this
principle applies when a contract is made which is allegedly contrary to "public
policy." What of the case where the contract at issue cannot be said to be
contrary to "public policy." It seems that the most appropriate principle for the
solution of our problem is the good faith principle. Contract law places a duty
on everyone who engages in negotiations towards making a contract to conduct
the negotiations in good faith.175 "Good faith" is an objective value which
reflects the proper balance between conflicting values which determine the
minimum level for the proper conduct of contractual negotiations.176 It is
possible to claim, therefore, that the provider of services is not conducting
negotiations in good faith when he refuses to provide service because of
discrimination on the basis of religion, race, and gender. The trouble is that the
case law in Israel says, in all of these situations, that the good faith principle
does not require equality and does not prohibit discrimination.'77
This question was dealt with in the Beit Yules case.178 The majority opinion
in that case was that the good faith principle does not require equality, whatever
the circumstances may be. Deputy President Elon gave expression to this, when
he stated:
179
Infusion of the equality obligation into the good faith principle, as if inequality is
contrary to good faith, is supplying content to the good faith concept which never
occurred to the legislature and which has no judicial or moral justification. Especially
'" Contracts Law (General Part), 5733-1973, para. 12.
176 This is the objective doctrine of culpa in contrahendo which was developed in
continental law. See N. Cohen, "Pre-contractual Duties: Two Freedoms and the
Contract to Negotiate" in J. Beetson and D. Friedmann, ed., Good Faith and Fault in
Contract Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995) at 25.
7 See Fur. Hrg. 22/82.
179 Ibid.
119 Ibid. at 471-472.
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since the good faith principle is one of the important and special principles of the
valued norms of our legal system, and it expresses the additional soul in this system -
especially because of this we must be careful not to include anything in it that is far
from its content and is not justified by its own terms.
According to this approach, the legal institution (tool) of private law, regarding
the obligation to conduct negotiations in good faith, cannot give expression to
the constitutional principle of equality.
The minority opinion took a different approach. President Meir Shamgar
noted that there are likely to be situations in which good faith will require
equality, and there are likely to be situations where good faith will not require
equality, stating: 0
It is not necessary for us to deal with the general and abstract question of what is the
connection between good faith and equality in every situation and in every circum-
stance. That is to say, we do not deal with ascertaining a general test of truth, which
will embrace every variety of possible relations between good faith and equality. An
absolute abstraction of a type of model, describing a closed circuit, as it were, where
interlocked good faith and obligation of equality constantly move, is not required and
is not even exact. There can be circumstances in which a relationship of equality will
be required, and there are circumstances in which there will not be an obligation as
stated, as it could be that [an individual] will be deemed to have acted with a lack of
good faith in given circumstances for acting unequally, and will not be deemed as such
in other circumstances in which he also acted unequally.
And I expressed a similar view in that case, where I stated:'
I accept - and it seems to me that we all accept - that there is no identity between
good faith and the equality principle. These two social principles are different from one
another. Accordingly, a person is likely to act in good faith without acting equally.
Thus, for example, if Reuven publishes a notice in a newspaper, according to which he
seeks to rent out an apartment, he is obligated to act in good faith in conducting the
negotiations with those who apply to him in response to the newspaper advertisement
... however, Reuven has no obligation to practice equality among the applicants. He is
entitled, for example, to rent the apartment to Almoni simply because of the color of
his hair and not to rent the apartment to Palmoni, who offers better terms. Nonetheless,
the good faith principle and the equality principle are not contradictory principles. One
Io Ibid.at 461.
"'J Ibid. at 479.
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does not exclude the other. Accordingly, the good faith principle is likely to be
expressed as a requirement of equality, and a discriminatory act is likely to be
considered an act which is not in good faith. The good faith principle and the equality
principle are principles which differ from each other and they deal with human
activities from different view points. Nonetheless, they are not contradictory principles.
Accordingly, there will be circumstances where the good faith principle will require
an action which is not equal. There will be circumstances where the good faith
principle will require action which is equal. It all depends on the circumstances.
According to this approach, the private law legal institution concerned with
good faith in negotiations is likely to be a framework for proper balance between
the freedom of connection and the equality principle. Indeed, in my view, the
majority opinion is based on error, but until it is changed, it is binding.
Nonetheless, alongside the reasons for changing it which are anchored in the
minority opinion, the following reason can now be added: the equality principle
is a constitutional principle by virtue of its being anchored in Basic Laws. It
must find expression in the private law. When inequality is expressed in
negotiations towards making a contract, the principal framework which is likely
to express the equality principle - in a balancing between it and other
conflicting principles - is the tool of good faith in negotiations. To this end, it
is necessary to acknowledge the possibility that, in appropriate circumstances -
circumstances in which the value of equality has prominence relative to other
values - the good faith principle requires equality.
6. New Tools: Negligence, Breach of Constitutional Duty, Abuse of
Right
Nonetheless, it should be acknowledged that it is necessary to develop other
private law tools, by means of which it will be is possible to cause the equality
principle to permeate into pre-contractual negotiations. I am primarily referring
to the tort of negligence, to breach of constitutional duty, and abuse of right. It
can be said that where, in balancing between the principle of freedom to make
or not to make a contract and the equality principle, the equality principle is
greater and a (notional) duty of care is imposed not to discriminate. Continental
courts operate in this manner.'82 From the general tort law rule prohibiting
182 See Larenz, supra note 104 at 53.
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causing damage caused maliciously or in an immoral manner,18 responsibility
for discriminatory negotiations was derived, in which framework it is possible
to even obtain an injunction."S Similarly, it is possible to view the constitutional
provision on equality as a provision intended to protect a category of people and
grant them a right, in a manner that breach of the duty constitutes a breach of a
constitutional duty.
Finally, a legal system which recognizes the general application of the
principle prohibiting abuse of right (abuse de droit),'85 is likely to see this rule
as a source for relief in private law for an unlawful harm - that is to say,
beyond that which is permitted by the balancing formula - in the equality
principle. The employment of this doctrine in Israel is problematic. The principle
prohibiting abuse of right appears in Israel in connection with property law and
it does not have, by virtue of its own power, general application.,8 6 To the extent
that these doctrines are insufficient, the indirect application principle must
develop the "Israeli-style common law" which will give expression to constitu-
tional rights at the pre-contractual stage. Indeed, this is the power and the impact
of the indirect application principle, from whose spirit constitutional human
rights "seethe" into private law, by means of the private law. This permeation
into the private law is accomplished, first and foremost, by means of existing
private law tools. Where these are insufficient, new tools must be created. If the
pre-contractual stage has not yet witnessed a breach of the equality principle, and
there is no application of the good faith principle, and the reach of other private
law doctrines is too short to help, it is necessary to create new private law
doctrines which will serve as channels for the permeation of constitutional
.83 See B.G.B., para. 826.
84 See Larenz, supra note 104 at 53.
On abuse of rights in comparative law, see H.C. Gutteridge, "Abuse of Rights" (1953)
5 Camb. L.J. 22; J.E. Scholtens, " Abuse of Rights" (1958) South African L.J. 39; J.
Cueto-Rua, "Abuse of Rights" (1975) 35 La. L. Rev. 965; V. Bolgar, "Abuse of Rights
in France, Germany and Switzerland: A Survey of a Recent Chapter in Legal Doctrine"
(1975) 35 La. L. Rev. 1015; K. Sono and Y. Fujioka, "The Role of the Abuse of Right
Doctrine in Japan" (1975) 35 La. L. Rev. 1037; C.J.H. Brunner, "Abuse of Rights in
Dutch Law" (1977) 37 La. L. Rev. 729.
86 See Land Law 5729-1965, para. 14. See also Z. Tseltner, "Abuse of Rights" Mishpatim
B 465 (5730).
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human rights into private law. Thus the "integrated tools" principle and the
(indirect) transfer of constitutional human rights into private law is preserved.
7. Application In Private Law And The Application To The Judiciary
Model
Recognition of the application of protected human rights in private law to a
great extent relieves the need for taking a stand regarding the application to the
judiciary model. 87 Indeed, the need for this model was created by the approach
that protected basic rights are directed solely against the government. The court
is characterized as an organ of the state, and thus (indirect) and partial applica-
tion of protected human rights to private law is made possible. All this is not
necessary if one takes the principal stand that human rights are protected not
only in relationships between man and the government, but also in relationships
between private parties. The court employs human rights, not because they are
directed against it as an organ of the state, but rather because they are directed
towards relations between private parties.
Nonetheless, it appears that there is no alternative to taking a stand regarding
the application to the judiciary model, for two reasons. First, it is necessary to
take a stand on the question whether "Israeli-style common law" is subject to
restrictions similar to those placed on legislation infringing protected basic
rights. In my opinion, the court is restricted in the creation of "Israeli-style
common law" by constitutional human rights. It is certainly so when the
common law deals with relationships between private parties and the govern-
ment. In my opinion, the restrictions apply to judge-made law also when it deals
with relationships between private parties. It is true that the "limitation formula"
is different, but in principle, constitutional human rights restrict judicial freedom
of action. Indeed, the court is an organ of the state, and it is appropriate that it
be subject to various restrictions arising from the constitutional protection given
human rights in constitutional provisions. The second reason suggests that if the
private law doctrines fail to fulfil their role, assistance can be garnered from the
creation of new tools in the application of human rights to the judiciary model.
Indeed, I myself do not view this model as competing with the other models, but
'8 For this model, see text associated with notes 57-64, supra.
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view it as a model that assists the other models, applying to them simultaneously
and likely to complete them when they fail.
D. PROTECTED HUMAN RIGHTS AND PRIVATE LAW
LEGISLATION
Basic Laws define human rights. The Basic Laws limit the protection given
to human rights by means of the limitations clause. A Knesset law that infringes
one private party's right against another private party harms "rights according
to this Basic Law" and, accordingly, must fulfil the conditions of the limitations
paragraph. The application of the limitations clause is not to be restricted,
therefore, to only those laws which harm private parties rights against the
government. Surely "civil" legislation, for example the codification of the civil
law or the new Companies Law, must fulfil the limitations clause. The
legislature again is not free to legislate private law at will. It must remain
cognizant of the limitations clause.
E. AN EXPLICIT CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENT FOR THE
APPLICATION OF PROTECTED HUMAN RIGHTS IN PRIVATE
LAW
Everyone agrees that constitutional human rights protect private parties
against the government (the state). Lack of clarity exists as to the application of
constitutional human rights in relationships between private parties. Are private
parties protected only against the state, or perhaps are they also protected against
other private parties. It seems to me that this lack of clarity is undesirable. The
issue is central and substantive both for public and private law. It is appropriate
to take a clear constitutional stance in this matter. It is also desirable that this
stance be taken by the authority which enacts the constitution, and not be left to
judicial discretion. This appears to be a lesson learned from study of comparative
law. Surely if one wishes to prevent the application of constitutional rights in
private law, it is desirable to state so explicitly. It is possible to say, for example,
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In my opinion, the text of the respect clause in the Basic Laws does not express
non-application clearly enough. This formula states that: 88
Every authority of the government authorities is obligated to respect the rights set forth
in this basic law.
From this text it does not appear that only government authorities - they, and
no other body - must honour the human rights set forth in the Basic Law. From
this text it appears that government authorities - every government authority
- must honour rights set forth in the basic law. At any rate, it appears to me that
the problem is sufficiently important to clarify this matter in a stronger way.
Moreover, if we want to negate the application to the judiciary model, it is
desirable to use explicit language in this regard. As we saw, the appropriate
arrangement in my opinion is that which recognizes the application of human
rights, set forth in the Basic Laws, to private law. It is desirable to establish an
explicit arrangement in this matter. The proposed Basic Law: Basic Human
Rights, contains a provision with the following language:189
No use may be made of a right from among the basic human rights for the purpose of
harming the existence of the State, the democratic regime or for oppressing human
rights.
It seems to me that the end of this provision - "for the purpose of oppressing
human rights" - is too narrow. It is necessary to consider the possibilities and
expand its scope and set forth that no use may be made of a right from among
the basic human rights, except in a manner which considers to an appropriate
extent the human rights of one's fellow man. Indeed, Reuven's human right is
limited by Shimon's human right, even if Shimon does not seek to oppress
Reuven's right and his only desire is to advance his own interests. Thereby
expression is given to the idea that human rights are directed not only against the
government, but also against other private parties.
... Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, para. 11; Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation,
para. 5.
189 Proposed Law, para. 22.
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